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1  Introduction 
 
One of the most striking facts in comparative political economy is the positive correlation 
between national income and democracy. Since the first statistical evidence was unearthed in the 
1950s by Seymour M. Lipset in his influential paper “Social Requisites of Democracy: 
Economic Development and Political Legitimacy” (Lipset, 1959), a lively debate amongst 
political scientists, sociologists, and economists regarding the correct interpretation of this 
correlation has raged. Lipset (1959, p. 86) himself interprets, in what has subsequently become 
known as modernization theory, the correlation as a unidirectional causal relationship from 
economic development to democracy or as he puts it “economic development involving 
industrialization, urbanization, higher educational standards and a steady increase in the overall 
wealth of the society is a basic condition sustaining democracy”. This interpretation is 
controversial.
1
 
We propose a new perspective on the modernization debate that we believe will help 
explore the boundaries of the theory in a more constructive way. We begin by observing that 
democracy is a package of institutions. This observation is neither new nor novel and most 
                                                 
1
 Amongst those skeptical, we count Moore (1966), Przeworski and Limongi (1997), and Acemoglu et al. (2008), while Barro (1999), Gundlach 
and Paldam (2009) and Boix (2011) present evidence consistent with Lipset's original interpretation. Others, e.g., Rueschemeyer et al. (1993), 
Ansell and Samuels (2015), Miller (2013), and Treisman (2015) have emphasized different mechanisms than Lipset (1959).  
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writers follow Dahl (1971) and make a distinction between different aspects of democracy. Yet, 
the modernization debate centers on the causal relationship between GDP per capita and 
composite indices of democracy. It is, therefore, either assumed that democratization is an all or 
nothing choice–a view that is contradicted by the historical record–or that all the sub-
components of the overall package are equally likely (or unlikely) to be causally driven by 
modernization. The alternative we propose is that modernization may be causally linked to 
specific sub-components of the overall package of democratic institutions without necessarily 
governing, in a causal sense, the evolution of the overall package or all of its parts. 
We focus on the secret ballot for three related reasons.
2
 First, the secret ballot is regarded 
as one of the cornerstones of fair elections (e.g., Rokkan, 1961; Elklit, 2000; Alvarez et al., 
1996). Baland and Robinson (2007, p. 140) note that “the introduction of political institutions 
that stop corruption and vote buying, such as the Australian ballot, appear to be as significant a 
step in the process of political development as the construction of electoral democracy itself.” 
Against this background, gaining a better understanding of how the secret ballot came about is 
important in itself.
3
 Second, there is a straightforward causal mechanism that links modernization 
to the secret ballot. The mechanism operates through the vote market. Vote markets thrive under 
open or semi-open voting because this allows the buyer of a vote to verify that the seller kept his 
part of the bargain. Modernization tends to erode social control and the scope for economic 
sanction, to improve outside options for ordinary voters, or to undermine old norms of social 
deference. Income growth also tends to increase the price of a vote. All of these forces combine 
to make vote buying less economical and the importance of vote markets is diminished. The 
defenders of the open ballot then become less stout defenders and ballot reform becomes more 
likely. Third, as we discuss in more detail below, a large body of research suggests that it is 
modernization and development that destroy clentelism in modern democracies. Historically, 
similar processes were in operation (e.g., Stokes et al., 2013) and the demise of the open vote and 
the introduction of secrecy in voting were a potentially important part of this process.  
We begin the analysis by formalizing our reasoning in a novel rational choice model of 
ballot reform. The model demonstrates why modernization undermines the vote market and how 
                                                 
2 Boix (1999), Blais et al. (2004), and Andrews and Jackman (2005) study the adoption of proportional representation, Przeworski (2008, 2009), 
Congleton (2011), Aidt and Franck (2015), Aidt and Jensen (2014) and Aidt and Leon (2015) study the causes of suffrage reform. The 
consequences (but not the causes) of secret ballot have been studied by Anderson and Tollison (1990), Heckelman (1995), and Aidt and Jensen 
(2009). 
3 See also Przeworski (2010). 
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this triggers the secret ballot. The logic is that modernization, while not necessarily eliminating 
vote buying altogether, reduces the importance of vote markets for those groups who benefit 
from their existence. This happens because the price of a vote is pushed up as voters become 
richer or become less willing to conform with norms of social deference. As a consequence of 
this, the hand of those groups which stand to gain from secret ballot is strengthened, while the 
hand of the groups that benefit from vote buying under open ballot is weakened. This makes 
ballot reform more likely and when the secret ballot is introduced, the scope for vote buying is 
further reduced (in the model eliminated entirely). The model, therefore, predicts i) that 
modernization makes secret ballot more likely and ii) that it gradually undermines (but does not 
eliminate) vote markets in the lead up to the introduction of secret ballot at which point vote 
markets are further undermined. To support these predictions empirically, we marshal two types 
of evidence. The first type is based on event history studies of the adoption of the secret ballot. 
This research design enables us to ask whether modernization–higher income levels, 
urbanization, and higher education standards–predicts the timing of ballot reform in two different 
historical samples: Western Europe plus English-speaking off-shoots (1820-1913) and US states 
(1840-1950). In both cases, we find strong evidence that modernization affected the timing of the 
secret ballot. In contrast, the same modernization variables cannot predict the timing of reforms 
that extended the suffrage to broader segments of the male population (Przeworski, 2009; Aidt 
and Jensen, 2014). The second type of evidence delves deeper into the underlying causal 
mechanism. With the secret ballot, the vote loses (much of) its value as a tradable commodity 
and voters have one less reason to vote. The implied drop in turnout can, therefore, be taken as 
an indicator of the importance of the vote market under open ballot. We can, then, ask whether 
the fall in turnout is smaller in places where modernization has progressed more, as one would 
expect if modernization encourages ballot reform by making electoral corruption less 
economical. We investigate this in a sample of US states (1870-1950) and in a sample of 
parliamentary constituencies of Great Britain in the election before and after the Ballot Act of 
1872. In both contexts, we find evidence consistent with the proposed causal mechanism. 
Our analysis speaks to a large literature on clientelism. A common theme of this literature 
is that structural forces, such as economic growth, industrialization, urbanization and expanding 
electorates, tend to undermine politics based on the exchange of a citizen’s vote for payments or 
continuing access to employment, goods and services and tend to encourage political parties to 
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establish other modes of distributive politics or to develop programmatic policy platforms. 
Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) emphasize how such structural forces interact with party 
competition to generate complex nonlinear dynamics. Stokes et al. (2013) emphasize monitoring 
and incentive problems in the relationship between party leaders and the intermediaries or 
brokers they need to employ in order to deliver private benefits to particular voters and to keep 
track of the holding-voters-to-account side of the vote market. Keefer and Vlaicu (2008) 
emphasize that vote buying emerges when political parties are unable to commit to 
programmatic policy platforms or lack the technologies to communicate them to large groups of 
voters. In all cases, modernization tends to make vote buying uneconomical and to increase the 
relative return to alternative electoral strategies. As in the broader literature on clientelism, our 
new theory of ballot reform emphasizes that modernization—income growth and education in 
particular—and franchise extension undermine vote markets. We argue that this generates a 
causal link running from modernization to ballot reform. This, in turn, generates particular 
patterns in electoral turnout that enables a more refined test of the theory. Our empirical 
finding—modernization was important for the demise of open voting—not only provides 
systematic, statistical evidence consistent with our particular model but also speaks to the 
broader literature on modernization and clientelism. The statistical analysis serves as a 
complement to the many insightful case studies presented in the existing literature to illuminate 
this link. 
    Our analysis is also related to the important work by Leemann and Mares (2011) and 
Mares (2015) on the politics of secret ballot in Imperial Germany. In that context, electoral 
corruption manifested itself mostly through intimidation of voters by employers and public 
officials. Mares (2015, chapter 7) shows that the demand for ballot reform (aimed at increasing 
the degree of secrecy in voting) in Prussia systematically came from politicians elected in 
constituencies with a high degree of economic diversification, presumably because electoral 
strategies based on intimidation were more costly in places with a more diversified employment 
structure. Our theory emphasizes how other aspects of modernization—income growth, 
urbanization, and education—increase the monetary cost of vote buying thereby reducing 
opposition to ballot reform. While the in-depth analysis of a single case, such as that of Prussia, 
has many advantages, the external validity will always be an issue. Our approach is to study the 
relationship between modernization and ballot reform (and the consequences thereof) using a 
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variety of research designs, ranging from cross country and cross state analyses to constituency 
level analysis within a given country. This, we believe, helps with external validity.  
Section 2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 3 contains the results of the two 
event history studies. Section 4 examines the effects of the secret ballot on turnout. Section 5 
discusses alternative mechanism and theories. Section 6 concludes. The supplementary material 
[intended for online publication] includes mathematical proofs and an evaluation of key 
assumptions, information on our coding of ballot reforms, definitions of all the variables used in 
the empirical investigation and their sources, and information on empirical robustness checks 
including instrumental variable estimations. 
 
2  A Theory of Ballot Reform 
 
We propose a new theory of ballot reform that formalizes the logic behind the three 
particular hypotheses that we test empirically.
4
  
 
2.1  Assumptions 
 
We consider a society with regular elections. The suffrage is not universal and voting is, 
initially, open. While we take the suffrage as given, the choice of ballot system is endogenous. In 
each period, two parties–party 𝐸 and party 𝑅–compete in an election. Party 𝐸 represents the old 
elite, while party 𝑅 represents the (enfranchised) middle or working classes, henceforth called 
the radicals.
5
 All 𝑁𝐸 core supporters of party 𝐸 can vote, while only some (𝑁𝑅) of party 𝑅’s core 
supporters are enfranchised. An (exogenous) increase in 𝑁𝑅 represents a franchise extension. The 
old elite is outnumbered 𝑁𝑅 > 𝑁𝐸. Voting is costly and some enfranchised voters may decide not 
to vote. The party allegiance of a voter is observable and the parties share policy preferences 
with their core voters. The party that gains the support of the majority of those who turn out to 
                                                 
4 For alternative theoretical models of vote buying, see Dekel et al. (2008), Snyder (1991), Heckelman and Yates (2002), Dal Bo (2007), Baland 
and Robinson (2008) and Stokes et al. (2013). 
5 The parties should not be interpreted literally as particular historical political parties. Party 𝐸 represents the old social elites whose claim to 
power is threatened by liberal democracy. Party 𝑅 represents groups who stand to gain from liberal democracy. In the context of 19th century 
Britain, they can be exemplified by Radical Members of Parliament, the Chartists, or the Westminster Committee; in the context of 19th and early 
20th century USA by the Mugwumps or Liberal Societies; and in the context of early 20th century Imperial Germany, by the liberal fraction of 
the parliament who proposed the use of standardized urns (Leemann and Mares, 2011, p. 7). 
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vote wins office. The historical context of our overall study does not suggest that the parties had 
the capacity (or incentive) to contest elections based on broad programmatic policy platforms. As 
in Keefer and Vlaicu (2008), the inability of parties to commit to programmatic policies is one of 
the factors that make vote buying attractive. Yet, voters would care, at least to a small extent, 
about which party is in power.
6
 To capture this, we assume that the policy with party 𝑅–policy 
𝑅–in power is better for voters of type 𝑅 than the policy associated with party 𝐸–policy 𝐸–and 
vice versa. With this in mind, we can write the utility gain for a voter of type 𝑅 or 𝐸 of having 
“their” party in power as 
 Δ𝑅 ≡ 𝑢𝑅(𝑅) − 𝑢𝑅(𝐸) > 0 (1) 
 Δ𝐸 ≡ 𝑢𝐸(𝐸) − 𝑢𝐸(𝑅) > 0, (2) 
where 𝑢𝑖(𝑗) is the utility that a voter of type 𝑖 ∈ {𝐸, 𝑅} derives from policy 𝑗 ∈ {𝐸, 𝑅}. It is 
possible that the utility loss per capita to the elite associated with a switch in power from party 𝐸 
to party 𝑅 is larger than the gain per capita to the radicals or vice versa. A neutral assumption is 
that gains and loses are of equal size and, as nothing substantial depends on it, we let Δ ≡ Δ𝑅 =
Δ𝐸. We observe that Δ—the utilty the utility difference between the policy platforms of the two 
parties—is likely to increase over time as parties aquire the technolgies needed to commit to 
more programatic policy platforms.  
The society has an infinitely long time horizon. Time is indexed by 𝑡 and the common 
discount factor is 𝛽 ∈ (0,1). Since calender time plays no important role, we omit time index 𝑡 
when it is not strictly needed. There are two possible ballot regimes: open or secret ballot. Under 
secret ballot (SB), there is no electoral corruption; under open ballot (OB), votes can be bought 
and sold in a vote market.
7
 Initially, the ballot is open, but the secret ballot may be adopted if the 
majority party proposes such a reform and the opposition party is unwilling to call a costly veto. 
Once secret ballot is introduced, it is not possible to go back to open ballot again. 
Within a given period, five stages (A to E) evolve sequentially. What happens within 
each stage depends on the ballot regime. 
 
                                                 
6 In some cases, this tension may manifest itself as a distributive conflict between the old elite and the majority of the electorate (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2006; Boix, 2003, chapter 1), but in other cases, the conflict may be about the type of public goods to provide, trade or education 
policy, or labor market regulation. 
7 Stokes (2005) along with the many detailed case studies in Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) show how party machines even in the presence of 
the secret ballot can use social networks to buy votes and how other forms of clientelism can survive. Accordingly, vote markets can exist even 
with secret voting, but they are clearly less effective. We make, for simplicity, the extreme assumption that the vote market shuts down with the 
arrival of the secret ballot, but it would be sufficient to assume that it is harder to buy votes under secret than under open ballot. 
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A. Planning. Under open ballot, the two parties (simultaneously) decide on how many 
opposition voters to target with a bribe in the upcoming election. We denote these targets by 𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏  
for 𝑗 ∈ {𝐸, 𝑅}.8 The associated cost is 𝑝𝑗𝑣~𝑗𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏  where 𝑝𝑗 is the money offered to a voter of type 
𝑗 in exchange for his vote (to be determined below) and 𝜐~𝑗 is the marginal cost of raising funds 
for party ~𝑗. The parties care about policy, the cost of electoral bribery, and being in power. 
Their per-period expected payoffs are  
 𝑉𝐸 = 𝑓𝐸(𝑢𝐸(𝐸) + 𝑀) + (1 − 𝑓𝐸)𝑢𝐸(𝑅) − 𝑝𝑅𝜐𝐸𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏  (3) 
 𝑉𝑅 = (1 − 𝑓𝐸)(𝑢𝑅(𝑅) + 𝑀) + 𝑓𝐸𝑢𝑅(𝐸) − 𝑝𝐸𝜐𝑅𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 , (4) 
where 𝑓𝐸  is the probability that party 𝐸 wins the election and 𝑀 is the utility value of political 
office. Under secret ballot, the parties do not, by assumption, buy votes. 
 
B. Electoral turnout. The enfranchised voters decide whether they want to vote. Under open 
ballot, each voter compares the sum of his expressive benefit of voting (𝜃) and the expected 
utility value of the bribe (𝑣𝑗
𝑒) to the utility cost of voting (𝑐 ∈ (0,1)). He votes if 𝜃 + 𝑣𝑗
𝑒 ≥ 𝑐 for 
𝑗 ∈ {𝐸, 𝑅} where the expected utility value of the bribe is  
 𝑣𝑗
𝑒 =
𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏
𝑁𝑗
𝑝𝑗𝜆𝑗 (5) 
and 𝜆𝑗 is the marginal utility of income. Letting the expressive benefit 𝜃 be uniformly distributed 
on [0,1] for all voters, the number of voters of type 𝑗 turning out to vote is 
 𝑛𝑗
𝑂𝐵(𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏 , 𝑁𝑗) = 𝑁𝑗(1 − 𝑐) + 𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏 𝑝𝑗𝜆𝑗. (6) 
Turnout amongst voters of type 𝑗 increases in the number of enfranchised voters of this type. 
More importantly, by offering bribes a party gives opposition voters an extra reason to turn out 
to vote. We notice the parties are not paying voters directly to turn out to vote. Rather this 
positive turnout effect is a side effect of vote buying. Under secret ballot, no bribes are offered 
and turnout is lower: 
 𝑛𝑗
𝑆𝐵(0, 𝑁𝑗) = 𝑁𝑗(1 − 𝑐). (7) 
It is possible that parties, as it becomes impossibly to buy votes outright, start engaging in 
negative turnout buying, i.e., pay opposition voters to abstain. We do not model this possibility 
explicitly, but note that turnout would fall even further after the ballot becomes secret if this 
                                                 
8 The notation ~𝑗 means “not 𝑗” , so if 𝑗 = 𝐸,   then ~𝑗 = 𝑅 and vice versa. 
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were the case. This, in turn, reinforces our main results. 
 
C. Vote buying. The voters who decided to vote show up at the polling station. Under open 
ballot, a vote market can operate. A voter of type 𝑗 is willing to shift his allegiance to party ~𝑗 if 
offered at least his reservation price (𝑝𝑗). The reservation price for a voter of type 𝑅 is the 
monetary sum needed to compensate him for the economic loss of having policy 𝐸 instead of 
policy 𝑅, and similarly for a voter of type 𝐸.9 Formally, 𝑝𝑗 = Δ𝜆𝑗
−1 for 𝑗 ∈ {𝐸, 𝑅}, where we use 
the marginal utility of income (𝜆𝑗) to convert the utility differential (Δ) into a monetary amount. 
The radicals are poorer than the elite. Since the marginal utility of income falls with income 
(𝜆𝐸 < 𝜆𝑅), the reservation price is higher for voters of type 𝐸 than for voters of type 𝑅. Under 
secret ballot, the vote market does not operate. 
 
D. Polling. The election outcome depends on the relative electoral support of the two parties and 
on random events that might induce some voters to shift their allegiances (after bribes, if any, are 
paid). This induces a preference shock (𝜂). The shock can, in principle, be positive (a shift to the 
radicals) or negative (a shift to the elite) and is introduced to capture the unpredictability of 
elections. Under open ballot, party 𝐸 wins a majority amongst those who turn out to vote if 
 
𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵−𝜂+𝑔(𝑣)
𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵+𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵 ≥
1
2
, (8) 
where 𝑣 = 𝛼𝐸𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏 − 𝛼𝑅𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏  is the (productivity adjusted) difference between the number of 
votes bought by party 𝐸 and party 𝑅. The function 𝑔, which is increasing, strictly concave and 
satisfies 𝑔(0) = 0, describes the exogenous vote buying technology. The two parameters (𝛼𝐸 
and 𝛼𝑅) represent measures of vote buying productivity. As Baland and Robinson (2008) point 
out, the productivity of vote buying depends, among other factors, on the economic and social 
sanctions that the buyer can impose on the seller if the vote contract is broken. One of the ways 
in which modernization can reduce electoral corruption is, therefore, by undermining the scope 
for economic and social sanctions, i.e., by lowering 𝛼𝑗. 
Under the assumption that 𝜂 is distributed uniformly on the interval [−
?̂?
2
,
?̂?
2
], the win 
probability of party 𝐸 under open ballot is  
                                                 
9 This is one way to conceptualize the cost of a vote. An isomorphic assumption is that a voter incurs an exogenous psychic cost voting against 
the party whose policy benefits him the most. We can then interpret Δ as this psychic utility cost. This would remove any instrumental element 
from the vote decision and have no consequence for the results of interest. 
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𝑓𝐸(𝑛𝐸
𝑏 , 𝑛𝑅
𝑏 , 𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵, 𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵) = {
0
1
?̂?
(
?̂?
2
+
𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵−𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵
2
+ 𝑔(𝑣))
1
} for
{
 
 
 
 (
𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵−𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵
2
+ 𝑔(𝑣)) < −
?̂?
2
(
𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵−𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵
2
+ 𝑔(𝑣)) ∈ −
?̂?
2
,
?̂?
2
]
(
𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵−𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵
2
+ 𝑔(𝑣)) >
?̂?
2 }
 
 
 
 
. (9) 
The win probability of party 𝑅 is 1 − 𝑓𝐸. Under secret ballot, the vote market shuts down 
(𝑔(0) = 0) and the win probability of party 𝐸 is 𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵 ≡ 𝑓𝐸(0,0, 𝑛𝐸
𝑆𝐵 , 𝑛𝑅
𝑆𝐵). Since party 𝑅 got 
more core supporters than party 𝐸, party 𝐸 is likely to lose under secret ballot (𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵 <
1
2
). After 
the election, the winner implements its most-preferred policy and earns the office rent (𝑀). 
 
E. Ballot reform.  Under open ballot, the winning party may propose that the secret ballot is 
adopted for future elections. While the majority party can implement its policy platform without 
the consent of the opposition, the opposition can, at a cost 𝜌 > 0, veto such a proposal. If a 
reform proposal is made and not vetoed, then the new ballot regime applies for all future 
elections. If the ballot is already secret, it stays secret. The idea we want to capture with the veto 
is that reforming the ballot system is fundamentally different from day-to-day policy making and 
needs to pass a stricter test than the simple majority rule. A natural way to think of the veto is 
that it represents the ease with which an upper chamber can block proposals from the lower 
chamber and at what cost.
10
 For example, even in the 19
th
 century where the British House of 
Lords had real power, most day-to-day policy making was a matter for the House of Commons, 
but institutional reforms would be subject to a veto constraint from the Lords, as the politics of 
the Great Reform Act of 1832 illustrates. The veto cost captures this reality is a simple and 
workable way.  
 
We analyze the model in two steps. First, we characterize the equilibrium in the vote 
market. Second, we study the reform process. 
 
2.2  The vote market  
 
If the secret ballot was introduced in the past, party 𝐸 wins with probability 𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵 <
1
2
. If 
                                                 
10Aidt and Giovannoni (2011) develop a theory of constitutional rules that rationalizes the distinction between special and day-to-day rules.  
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not, the vote market can flourish and the two parties must, in stage 𝐴, decide how many 
opposition voters to target with bribes in the upcoming election, anticipating events as they 
unfold in the subsequent stages. Using equations (3) and (4) and recalling from equation (6) that 
∂𝑛𝑗
𝑂𝐵
∂𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏 = Δ and 𝑝𝑗 = Δ𝜆𝑗
−1 for 𝑗 ∈ {𝐸, 𝑅}, the two first order conditions governing these choices 
can be stated as follows: 
 𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏 : 
1
?̂?
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
(𝑣) ≤
𝜐𝐸Δ
𝜆𝑅𝛼𝐸(Δ+𝑀)
+
Δ
2?̂?𝛼𝐸
  with = if 𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏 > 0 (10) 
 𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 : 
1
?̂?
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
(𝑣) ≤
𝜐𝑅Δ
𝜆𝐸𝛼𝑅(Δ+𝑀)
+
Δ
2?̂?𝛼𝑅
  with = if 𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 > 0. (11) 
The two terms on the right-hand side shows the cost of buying an extra vote. The first term is the 
direct (utility) cost per vote. The second term represents the reduction in the win probability of 
the party that offers the extra bribe because bribery increases turnout amongst opposition voters. 
The left-hand side represents the increase in the win probability of allocating an extra dollar to 
buying opposition votes before adjusting for productivity differences (captured by 𝛼𝑗) and is the 
same for the two parties. An implication, then, is that only the party with the lowest productivity 
adjusted cost buys votes.
11
 Under Assumption 1, this party is the minority party representing the 
elite. 
 
Assumption 1 
𝜐𝐸
𝜆𝑅𝛼𝐸(𝛥+𝑀)
+
1
2?̂?𝛼𝐸
<
𝜐𝑅
𝜆𝐸𝛼𝑅(𝛥+𝑀)
+
1
2?̂?𝛼𝑅
.  
 
 Assumption 1 is likely to be satisfied because voters of type 𝑅 are cheaper to buy than 
voters of type 𝐸, as they are poorer (𝜆𝑅 > 𝜆𝐸); because the elite can raise funds at lower cost 
than the radicals (𝜐𝐸 < 𝜐𝑅); and because the elite is more effective at buying votes than the 
radicals (𝛼𝐸 > 𝛼𝑅), as they can use social sanctions more effectively. The equilibrium win 
probability of party 𝐸 is  
 𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵 ≡ 𝑓𝐸(𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ , 0, 𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵(0), 𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵(𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ )) > 𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵 , (12) 
where 𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗  represents how many radical voters party 𝐸 offers bribes to at equilibrium. 
The equilibrium in the vote market (𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ ) and the win probability of the minority party, 
𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵, are affected by three key parameters, 𝛼𝐸 , 𝜆𝑅 and 𝑁𝑅. Firstly, an increase in the transaction 
                                                 
11 See the supplementary material appendix S1 for proofs and derivations. 
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cost (a fall in 𝛼𝐸) reduces the marginal benefit of each bribe and, as a consequence, party 𝐸 
targets fewer opposition voters and the vote market shrinks. This gives radical voters one less 
reason to vote and their turnout falls. Yet, the net effect is that party 𝑅 is more likely to win a 
majority. Secondly, a fall in the private marginal value of income (𝜆𝑅) increases the price of a 
vote. Intuitively, radical voters value money less and so require a higher monetary compensation 
to shift their allegiance. This increases the cost of bribery and party 𝐸 buys fewer votes. The vote 
market shrinks, and although turnout falls amongst voters of type 𝑅, the consequence is, again, 
that the win probability of party 𝐸 goes down. An exogenous franchise extension–an increase in 
𝑁𝑅–does not affect the absolute number of opposition voters party 𝐸 wants to bribe but the 
relative share drops and, as a consequence, the win probability of party 𝐸 falls. Suffrage reform 
makes vote buying uneconomical. 
We contend that “modernization”–income growth, urbanization and education–are 
systematically related to the transaction cost of vote buying and to the marginal value of income. 
The latter relationship is immediate: income growth combined with the standard assumption of 
diminishing marginal utility of consumption implies that the private marginal value of income 
(𝜆𝑅) decreases with income growth. This increases the price of a vote and gradually reduces the 
volume of transactions in the market for votes. The first relationship between “modernization” 
and the transaction cost of vote buying (𝛼𝐸) is more complex and requires elaboration. First, a 
vote market operates most effectively in environments with a high degree of economic 
dependency, social control and deference to authority. The examples of Britain before the Ballot 
Act of 1872 and Imperial Germany, which nominally had secret ballot from 1871, demonstrate 
how the social structures of small towns and villages enabled local authorities and elites to 
control elections through outright bribery or through social deference.
12
 Industrialization and 
urbanization disturb this equilibrium by opening up new economic possibilities for working and 
middle class voters and by making them economically mobile. This destroys traditional patron-
client networks, which, once they are gone, are difficult to re-create (Hicken, 2007). Anderson 
(1993, p. 1458) paraphrases the argument about urbanization in her analysis of Imperial 
Germany as follows: “supported by the anonymity of the new megalopolis, [...], voters escape 
both the meshes of deference and the terrors of officials and employers. Town air makes free. 
Such cities were simply too large for traditional authorities to control.” The transition from a 
                                                 
12 Anderson (1993), Lee (1994, p. 144) and Mares (2015). 
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static agrarian economy to a dynamic industrial economy with deeper markets and economic 
specialization, therefore, makes it harder for the old elite to enforce and monitor vote contracts, 
and the transaction cost of vote buying shoots up. Moreover, economic development “weakens 
the power of the landlord class and strengthens subordinate classes. The working and the middle 
classes [...] gain an unprecedented capacity for self-organization due to such developments as 
urbanization, factory production, and new forms of communication and transportation” 
(Rueschemeyer et al., 1993, p. 75). By allowing new political parties and special interest groups 
(e.g., unions) to emerge, this also serves to undermine old structures of deference. While it is 
clear, then, that urbanization breaks down structures that previously enabled vote markets, large 
urban electorates are not a guarantee that electoral corruption is eliminated. The experience of 
many American cities, e.g., New York, in the Gilded Age clearly demonstrates that politicians 
and parties determined to control the electorate can find new ways of doing so (Fredman, 1968). 
Urbanization may, therefore, have encouraged electoral corruption in some contexts (e.g., in US 
migration cities), while having discouraged it in others (e.g., in Britain and Germany). Second, 
modernization is associated with a rise in literacy and since “education presumably broadens 
men’s outlooks, enables them to understand the need for norms of tolerance, restrains them from 
adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and increases their capacity to make rational 
electoral choices” (Lipset, 1959, p. 79), this also makes it harder to enforce vote contracts. 
Taken together, these arguments suggest that modernization, either directly through the 
effect on the marginal value of income or indirectly through urbanization and the rise of 
education, reduces the incentive of parties, which benefit from electoral corruption, to use vote 
buying as an electoral strategy. Consequently, as modernization progresses under open ballot, 
vote markets continue to exist but they become less and less important and fewer and fewer votes 
are bought and sold in them. This, in turn, has, as we shall now show formally, implications for 
the likelihood of ballot reform. 
 
2.3  Ballot reform 
 
At stage 𝐸, the winning party can, if the ballot regime at time 𝑡 is open ballot, propose to 
adopt the secret ballot for future elections. Clearly, party 𝐸 has a no reason to do so. A reform 
proposal must come from party 𝑅 which stands to improve its electoral prospect (𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵 > 𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵). 
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The implication, then, is that a reform proposal is tabled at time 𝑡 only if party 𝑅 wins the 
election under the open ballot. This happens with probability 1 − 𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵. As discussed above, both 
modernization and franchise extension increase the cost of buying votes in the market. Party 𝐸, 
therefore, rationally buys fewer votes and its electoral prospect deteriorates. This increases the 
likelihood that ballot reform is proposed. Whether it will be reformed, however, depends on the 
elite’s willingness to veto.  
Suppose that party 𝑅 wins the election at time 𝑡 and proposes a reform. Party 𝐸 can veto 
this proposal at cost 𝜌 > 0. By doing so, the ballot remains open in period 𝑡 + 1, but another 
veto may have to be called if party 𝑅 happens to win again and so on. To evaluate the elite’s 
willingness to veto, we compare the present discounted value of a veto to the present discounted 
value of accepting the ballot reform: 
 𝑊𝐸(no veto) = 𝛽
(1−𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵)𝑢𝐸(𝑅)+𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵(𝑢𝐸(𝐸)+𝑀)
1−𝛽
 (13) 
 𝑊𝐸(veto) = 𝛽
(1−𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵)𝑢𝐸(𝑅)+𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵(𝑢𝐸(𝐸)+𝑀)
1−𝛽
 (14) 
 −
𝛽𝑣𝐸Δ𝜆𝑅
−1𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ (.)
1−𝛽
−
𝛽(1−𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵)𝜌
1−𝛽
− 𝜌. 
Under secret ballot, power simply alternates between the two parties according to the win 
probability 𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵, which is determined by the relative turnouts of the two groups and random 
events. This is what the numerator of equation (13) represents. Since not calling a veto at time 𝑡 
means a permanent switch to secret ballot starting at time 𝑡 + 1, this expected value is 
discounted by the factor 
𝛽
1−𝛽
. A veto preserves the open ballot for another period. Under open 
ballot, power alternates between the two parties according to the win probability 𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵, which 
takes into account the vote market. This is represented by the first term of equation (14). On top 
of this comes the cost of buying votes each period (the second term) and the veto cost, which is 
paid after each electoral defeat in the future (the third term). The fourth term is the veto cost at 
time 𝑡. 
The elite’s willingness to veto is the difference between 𝑊𝐸(veto) and 𝑊𝐸(no veto). We 
can state the condition under which the elite will veto as: 
 
𝛽
1−𝛽
{(𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵 − 𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵)(Δ + 𝑀) − 𝑣𝐸Δ𝜆𝑅
−1𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ (. )} ≥ 𝜌 +
𝛽(1−𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵)𝜌
1−𝛽
. (15) 
The left-hand side represents the net benefit of the veto. This depends positively on the electoral 
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advantage that the vote market gives party 𝐸 (𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵 − 𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵) and negatively on the cost of bribery. 
The right-hand side represents the veto cost. 
The costs and benefits of a veto depend on the two modernization parameters (𝛼𝐸 and 
𝜆𝑅) and how many of party 𝑅’s core voters have been enfranchised (𝑁𝑅). Modernization–
represented either by an increase in the transaction cost or by income growth–makes the elite less 
likely to veto. The reason is that modernization reduces the electoral advantage gained from the 
vote market (the gap between 𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵 and 𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵 narrows) while at the same time the frequency with 
which a veto is required goes up because party 𝑅 is more likely to win office. Franchise 
extension also makes the elite less likely to veto a subsequent ballot reform. Since the total 
number of opposition voters targeted is unaffected, the gap between 𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵 and 𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵 is unaffected 
by an increase in 𝑁𝑅. However, party 𝑅 becomes more likely to win elections and, for that 
reason, the expected veto cost increases and this is what makes party 𝐸 less willing to call a veto. 
We summarize these insights in three hypotheses which we test empirically. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (The modernization hypothesis). Modernization increases the likelihood that the 
secret ballot is adopted.  
 
Hypothesis 2 (The franchise hypothesis). An extension of the franchise increases the likelihood 
that the secret ballot is adopted subsequently.  
 
Hypothesis 3 (The turnout interaction hypothesis). The secret ballot is associated with a fall in 
electoral turnout and this fall is smaller where modernization has progressed the most.  
 
The third hypothesis requires elaboration. Under open ballot, modernization gradually 
reduces turnout. This is because as the price of a vote goes up, party 𝐸 becomes less willing to 
buy votes. As a consequence, from the point of view of a voter of type 𝑅, the value of voting 
and, in expectation, be offered a bribe falls and more and more such voters decide to stay at 
home. Our theory does not necessarily suggest that the vote market has disappeared by the time 
the secret ballot is introduced, only that fewer votes are being bought and sold than in previous 
times. Accordingly, secret ballot also leads to a fall in turn out because at that point, what 
remains of the vote market shuts down altogether. To see how the two effects interact to generate 
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hypothesis 3, imagine two societies which happen to introduce the secret ballot at the same time. 
The only difference between the two is that one is, say, richer than the other. Consequently, the 
vote market is less vibrant and fewer voters bother to vote in the rich than in the poor country in 
the years leading up to the reform. When the reform happens, the fall in electoral turnout is 
smaller in the rich than in the poor country. 
Our theory is developed in the context of direct vote buying. In reality indirect vote 
buying through employment relationships or other favours played an equally important role in 
many countries, most notably perhaps Imperial Germany (Ziblatt, 2009; Leemann and Mares, 
2011; Mares, 2015) or Chile (Baland and Robinson, 2008). So, do our predictions regarding 
“modernization” and the secret ballot also apply to a market dominated by indirect vote buying? 
The answer is that they do. To see this, notice that we can reinterpret the price (𝑝𝑗) as an effort 
cost incurred by the parties. Effort can coerce voters to “accept” the utility cost Δ, which we 
might reinterpret as a psychic cost of voting against once preferred party, because the sanction 
associated with not doing so is greater. “Modernization” reduces the scope for social control by 
increasing the effort cost required to buy votes and in that way undermines the value of indirect 
vote buying.
13
 
 
3  Event history studies of the secret ballot 
 
The aim of our event history study is to explain the timing of the secret ballot. We model 
the (conditional) probability that a country or a state which has not yet adopted the secret ballot 
adopts it in a given year as a function of quantitative measures of modernization, the franchise, 
and other potential determinants of ballot reform. 
We explore two different historical samples—Western Europe plus off-shoots (1820-
1913) and the US states (1840-1950)—that cover the relevant period during the 19th and 20th 
centuries when the secret ballot replaced the open ballot. We are aware that this is a small subset 
of the countries or states that have undergone the transition from open to secret ballot. Given the 
constraints imposed by the availability of quantitative historical data on modernization, in 
                                                 
13
 The model is based on a number of simplifying assumptions which we believe make sense in the context. We 
have, however, investigated the robustness of the results to many alternative assumptions. The details of these 
permutations are included in the supplementary material appendix S1. The bottom line is that the predictions are 
robust. 
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particular, GDP per capita, it is not possible to expand the Western Europe plus off-shoots 
sample further, say, with countries from Eastern Europe.
14
  
We are interested in the year in which the secret ballot became effective in a country or a 
state. By effective we mean that the ballot rules were such that voters could cast their vote in 
private (i.e., without the vote choice being observed and unduly influenced by others) and that it 
was impossible ex post to reconstruct how a particular voter voted. We focus on when the secret 
ballot became effective, because this is what our theory suggests is relevant. In the theory, the 
secret ballot is introduced when the benefits to the elites are less than the veto cost. Introducing 
secret ballot de jure but with ways to circumvent secrecy works similarly to the veto in our 
theoretical model. From a practical point of view, de jure secrecy may not be de facto secrecy. 
This may be so because of non-standard ballot paper of different collors or shapes; because of 
non-standard urns (for example, a small urn which preserves the order of voting can reveal the 
choices of individual voters ex post); or because of the absence of a place where the ballot can be 
filled in and placed in the urn without outsiders being able to observe the act (Mares, 2015). 
A number of different arrangements can in principle and in practise make the ballot secret 
in this sense. One such arrangement is the Australian ballot. The Australian ballot requires, at 
least, two things, First, all parties/candidatesare listed/printed on the same ballot paper, and, 
second, these ballot papers are printed by the state at the public’s expense and distributed only at 
the polling stations and placed in a standard-sized urn in privacy. Another arrangement is the so-
called “ballot and envelope” system, practiced in, e.g., France, Sweden and Spain. It requires the 
state to print the ballot papers, but one ballot paper is printed per party or candidate. The voter 
then chooses the paper for the party/candidate he wants to cast his vote for, puts it in an envelope 
and deliver it to the ballot box. This type of arrangement (and others like it) is more open to 
abuse than the Australian ballot but de jure makes the ballot secret. In coding the year in which 
secret ballot was introduced in the countries covered by the Western European plus off-spring 
sample, our rule is that a new ballot arrangement qualifies as “secret ballot” if our sources 
indicate that the relevant change in balloting procedures effectively made the act of voting 
private. In most cases, it is straight forward to establish the year of adoption thus defined, but in 
some cases, most notably Germany, there is disagreement about when the ballot became 
                                                 
14
The problem with extending the sample to Eastern Europe is that reliable historical data on GDP per capita and other aspects of modernization 
are very limited. The evolution of democratic institutions in many eastern European countries during the 19th century, however, followed a pattern 
not all that dissimilar to that in Western Europe. In particular, Aidt and Jensen (2014) report that the dynamics of suffrage reform was comparable 
in the two parts of Europe. We do, therefore, not believe that sample selection bias is a major issue, although we cannot rule it out altogether. 
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effectively secret. We use 1913, when standard urns were introduced in the main specification, 
but note that our results are unchanged if we instead use 1903 when ballot envelopes and 
isolating places where introduced (Mares, 2015). In the supplementary material (appendix S2), 
we provide information on how we coded the year of adoption for each country and why. For the 
sample of US states, we code the year in which the ballot in a state became Australian in state-
wide elections based on the information provided by Lott and Kenny (1999). 
The dependent variable 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 is coded one if country (or state) 𝑖 introduced the 
secret ballot in year 𝑡 and as zero in the years before and after that. A country (or state) drops out 
of the sample in the year after its adoption. We assume that all polities were at “risk” of adopting 
the secret ballot from the beginning of the (relevant) sample period or when they became 
independent. This assumption is justified by historical facts. By the late 18th century the secret 
ballot was widely debated in liberal circles and supported by philosophers, such as Jeremy 
Bentham. In Britain, the secret ballot was proposed by the Westminster Committee as early as 
1780 (Schofield, 2004). Thus, the principle of secret ballot was known and on the agenda in 
many countries by 1820. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the countries (states) under 
consideration could have adopted the secret ballot from 1820 (1840) onwards. 
As in Beck et al. (1998), we estimate a discrete logistic model:
15
  
 𝑃(reform𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 = 0) =
1
1+𝑒−(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛾+𝐻(.))
. (16) 
The variable 𝑚𝑖𝑡−1 is an indicator variable equal to zero in each year before introduction of the 
secret ballot and equal to one thereafter. Through the function 𝐻(. ), we allow the hazard rate to 
be time-varying and a function of the number of years a country has been at risk of adoption.
16
 
This is important because the likelihood of adoption may increase as time passes. By taking 
duration dependence into account, we avoid confounding any modernization or franchise effect 
with a spurious correlation between two upwards trending variables. The vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡 represents 
three main groups of explanatory variables. The first group contains indicators of modernization, 
such as the log of real GDP per capita, the urbanization rate, and measures of education 
attainment standards. The second group contains variables related to the extension of the 
                                                 
15 Beck et al. (1998) show how the logit model can be derived from the Cox proportional hazard model. The logit formulation has the advantage 
of being easier to interpret, of allowing for flexible estimation of duration dependence, and of making it possible to adjust for rare events. For 
these reasons, it is widely used in event history studies. 
16 An alternative to this is to use calendar time to track the baseline hazard. This would, for example, make sense if the trend in the hazard rate is 
global. We have re-estimated all the logit models using a common time trend defined on calendar time and it makes no difference to the results. 
We prefer the specification with clock time since it allows for country-specific idiosyncrasies. 
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franchise. The third group contains variables that capture alternative causes of ballot reform. 
Many scholars emphasize the importance of landholding and income inequality in relation to 
democratization in general. We expect that landholding inequality makes the secret ballot less 
likely because inequality along this dimension often reflects a social order that favors vote 
buying. Other scholars, e.g., Wejnert (2005), Gleditsch and Ward (2006), and Leeson and Dean 
(2009), emphasize international diffusion of democracy. Governments in one polity may learn 
from political reforms—in our case ballot reforms—in other polities, and more so from those 
which are either linguistically or physically nearer. Finally, we control for population size. 
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Table 1: The effect of modernization of the probability of secret ballot in Western Europe plus off-shoots 1820-1913. 
Dependent variable: reform 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
log(real GDP per capita) 6.36**  6.62*  5.43**  5.32  0.15* 
 [2.44]  [1.77]  [2.11]  [1.44]  [1.99] 
Urbanization rate   0.01*** -0.001   0.09*** -0.001   
  [3.65] [-0.21]   [3.38] [-0.01]   
First principal component    1.46***    1.29***  
    [3.27]    [2.94]  
Electorate/adult population 0.037 0.055** 0.034 0.05* 0.034 0.051** 0.033 0.033 0.002 
 [1.26] [2.30] [0.94] [1.87] [1.19] [2.17] [0.94] [0.94] [0.92] 
Gini coefficient 28.49 12.33 28.35 16.80 25.36 12.03 26.21 26.21 -1.041 
 [1.44] [0.66] [1.39] [0.93] [1.30] [0.66] [1.30] [1.30] [-1.12] 
log(population) -0.50** -0.76*** -0.46 -0.71** -0.41* -0.66** -0.39 -0.39 0.13 
 [-2.04] [-2.80] [-1.35] [-2.54] [-1.72] [-2.47] [-1.18] [-1.18] [1.65] 
Learning -1.18 1.2 -1.26 0.22 -1.03 0.93 -1.03 -1.03 0.001 
 [-0.94] [1.56] [-0.95] [0.27] [0.84] [1.44] [-0.78] [-0.78] [0.03] 
          
Joint significance of modernization variables   6.24**    4.91*   
Control for duration dependence  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 779  732 732 732 779 732 732 732 779 
Estimation method Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Rare 
Events 
Rare 
Events 
Rare 
events 
Rare 
events 
Fixed 
Effects 
OLS 
Notes:  Robust z-statistics correcting for clustering by country in brackets (i.e., we allow the errors to be correlated over time within countries, but not between 
countries). Constants not reported. All estimations based on sample of 14 countries. The small number of countries raises the concern that the standard errors 
corrected for clustering are misleading. We have done two checks to judge the relevance of this issue. First, we use more conservative critical values for the t-
distribution based on G-K degrees of freedom with G being the number of clusters and K the number of variables (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Second, we apply 
a wild cluster bootstrap in the linear probability model (Cameron et al., 2008). None of these techniques indicate that the inference based on the clustered 
standard errors reported in the table are misleading. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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3.1  Western Europe plus off-shoots 
 
The Western Europe plus off-shoots sample covers, for the period from 1820 to 1913, 
11 Western European countries
17
 plus the USA, Canada, and New Zealand. The first country 
in the sample to introduce the secret ballot was the Netherlands in 1849; the last ones were 
France and Germany in 1913. Before the secret ballot, electoral corruption was widespread. 
In many Western European countries vote buying was, during the 19th century, concentrated 
in the countryside where social control and employment relations made it relatively easy for 
the landed elites to run vote markets (e.g., Ziblatt, 2009; Seymour, 1915, p. 433; Mackie, 
2000). In the USA, vote markets were also widespread in the countryside, but they were often 
particularly vibrant in the big migration cities where party machines exploited that colored 
voting papers, indicating party choice, could be handed out at the polling stations (Cox and 
Kousser, 1981; Ostrogorski, 1964). 
In Table 1, we report the results of the event history study. We see that the 
coefficients on the two modernization variables, urbanization rate and real GDP per capita, 
are positive and statistically significant (columns one and two).
18
 When they enter together 
(column three), they are jointly significant and real 𝐺𝐷𝑃 per capita remains significant on its 
own. The two variables are positively correlated, with a correlation coefficient of 0.75, and 
are likely to capture the same underlying concept of modernization. It, therefore, makes sense 
to extract the principal components. In column four, we replace the two modernization 
variables with the first principal component which correlates positively with real GDP per 
capita and with urbanization rate.
19
 This component has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient. Ballot reform is a rare event and this may bias the estimates. King and 
Zeng (2001) propose a logit estimator that deals with this. In columns five to eight, we report 
results using this estimator. The two modernization variables remain individually significant 
and jointly significant when entered together or as the first principal component. To 
quantitatively evaluate the modernization effect, we may begin by noticing that, based on the 
specification in column three, the probability of a ballot reform in a given year conditional on 
the average values of the covariates is 0.3 percent. Suppose now that real GDP per capita 
increases by one standard deviation, keeping all other variables at their average values. As a 
                                                 
17 The Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Belgium, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Sweden, France and Germany. 
18 Systematic information on enrollment in education or other proxies for education levels are not available for a sufficiently long time span 
for this sample. As a rough proxy, we have coded a dummy variable which takes the value of zero for each country till enrollment in 
primary education amongst 7 to 14 year old reaches 60 percent and then is one thereafter. The 60 percent cut off is the lowest cut off we can 
capture with the spare data available. We note that this variable is not significant most likely due to measurement error [not reported]. 
19 The factor loadings on the first principal component are equal to 0.93 for both variables. 
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consequence of this the predicted probability of reform in a given year increases to 2.6 
percent. While ballot reform remains an unlikely event in any given year, we observe that the 
likelihood increases many fold as GDP per capita increases.
20
 
We use information on the number of eligible voters as a proportion of the adult 
population, electorate/adult population, to test the franchise hypothesis. The results reported 
in Table 1 are not favorable. Although the point estimate is positive, it is only statistically 
significant in specifications where real GDP per capita is excluded. Overall, it was not the 
pre-secret ballot expansion of the suffrage that triggered the secret ballot. 
Income inequality, as measured by the gini coefficient, is (statistically) unrelated to 
the timing of the secret ballot. This runs counter to other recent evidence on the effect of 
inequality on democratization.
21
 The control variable population always has a negative 
coefficient, but is usually not significant, suggesting that scale effects were unimportant. The 
variable learning captures diffusion effects. It is a “distance” weighted index of reforms in 
neighboring countries, where we use the information on linguistic similarities provided by 
Fearon (2003) to measure distance. Despite the fact that the adoptions of the secret ballot 
cluster in the 1870s, we find little evidence that social learning was important. A similar 
result is reported in Aidt and Jensen (2014) in relation to international diffusion of suffrage 
reforms. These results contradict the strong evidence on international diffusion of democracy 
coming from studies of large panels of countries, either in the second half of the 20
th
 century 
(e.g., Gleditsch and Ward, 2006) or the entire period from 1820 or 1850 to 2000 (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2009 or Leeson and Dean, 2009). These studies focus on composite democracy 
measures (mostly the Polity IV index). Our results pertain to the first wave of 
democratization and to specific aspects of the package of democratic institutions. It appears 
that international diffusion of specific institutions was not all that important for the early 
democratizations in Western Europe. 
The results reported in Table 1 are estimated from a combination of between and 
within country variation in modernization, the size of the electorate, inequality, etc. It is, 
therefore, possible that the correlations are driven by the same unobserved factors and that 
they are coincident rather than causal. To show that this is most likely not the case, we have 
undertaken two additional tests, both of which force us to work with a linear probability 
                                                 
20 We have investigated the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between modernization and the secret ballot. For the Western Europe plus 
off-shoots sample, we find evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between real GDP per capita and the adoption probability, but 
this fails to replicate in the US states sample. 
21 Ziblatt (2008), Boix (2003, chapter 2), or Ansell and Samuels (2010). 
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model.
22
 Firstly, we have estimated a linear fixed effects model which takes into account 
country-specific unobserved heterogeneity. We report the results in column nine of Table 1. 
We observe that the coefficient on the main modernization variable, real GDP per capita, 
now estimated only from variation within each of the 14 countries over time, is significant 
with a robust t-statistic of 1.99. Secondly, we have estimated the linear probability model 
with an instrumental variables estimator. We use a weighted index of the level of (log) real 
GDP in other countries as an instrument for (log) GDP per capita in a particular country. This 
is similar to Acemoglu et al. (2008), except that we use inverse distance rather than trade 
shares as weights. The main threat to the validity of the instrument is the possibility that an 
increase in real GDP per capita abroad induces ballot reform and this experience diffuses 
internationally. We deal with this by including the variable learning, which controls for the 
diffusion process, in the estimations. We use a measure of revolutionary shocks in 
neighboring countries as an instrument for the extension of the franchise in particular 
countries (see Aidt and Jensen (2014)). The instrumental variables results are reported and 
discussed in appendix S4 (Tabe S4) in the supplementary material. They show that the 
baseline results are robust and may be given a causal interpretation. 
 
3.2  US States 
 
The first US state to adopt the secret ballot, which for this sample we define as 
Australian ballot, statewide was Massachussts in 1888 and the last was South Carolina in 
1950. Before the Australian ballot, electoral corruption was widespread. Bensel (2004) notes 
that the introduction in many states of the ticket system prior to the Australian ballot provided 
some privacy for voters, but also stresses that the degree of secrecy should not be overstated. 
The issue was that parties were able to ascertain voting behavior because they supplied voters 
with ballot papers (Lehoucq, 2007). Fredman (1968, p. 22) describes how it worked: “the 
simplest form of bribery occurred when ballot peddlers or district captains paid a voter as he 
emerged from the polling place. To check that he actually used the ballot it was colored or 
otherwise recognizable and the compliant voter was followed up to the booth.” McCook 
(1892) estimates that sixteen percent of voters in Connecticut were up for sale at prices 
ranging from two to twenty dollars. Stokes et al. (2013) emphasize that the Australian ballot 
                                                 
22 The linear probability model is only a good approximation, if events in the tails are unimportant. Since adoption of the secret ballot is an 
unlikely event, the tails are likely to be important, and we are careful not to read too much into the size of the point estimates obtained with 
the linear probability model. 
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reduced the effectiveness of vote buying in the US, and that it did so by diminishing “the 
observability of voter’s choices” (p. 183). The most corrupt 19th century state elections are 
said to have occurred in New York and San Francisco. The reason was the high concentration 
of poor voters and recent immigrants unused to the franchise (Fredman, 1968, p. 25). 
Congleton (2011, p. 560) notes that the introduction of the Australian ballot “allowed votes to 
be cast without fear of rebuke by landlords or employers”. Taken together this suggests that 
the ballot became effectively secret in the US states with the arrival of the Austrialien ballot.  
We use three quantitative indicators of modernization–real income per worker, 
average years of schooling, and urbanization rate. From Table 2, we see that each of the 
modernization variables is positively and significantly correlated with the timing of the secret 
ballot (columns one to three). When included together in column four, they are jointly 
significant and real income per worker and average years of schooling remain significant on 
their own. We replace the three variables with the first principal component in column five 
and note it is highly significant.
23
 These results are robust to alternative estimation 
techniques, as shown in columns five and six. 
To evaluate the size of the modernization effect, suppose that real income per worker 
increases by one standard deviation. Using the specification in column four and keeping all 
other variables at their average values, this increases the predicted probability of a ballot 
reform from 0.21 to 0.37 percent. This effect is smaller than in the Western Europe plus off-
shoots sample, but still substantial. 
Unlike in Western Europe, 60-90 percent of adult (white) males was enfranchised 
already in the 1840s. Nevertheless, the states applied various strategies to de facto restrict the 
suffrage. These included requiring payment in full of poll taxes and subjecting potential 
voters to literacy tests. These steps served to keep poor and illiterate males off the election 
roll, often aimed at disenfranchising African Americans (Keyssar, 2009, chapters 4 and 5). 
Women’s suffrage rights also varied and some of the frontier states granted women the right 
to vote long before it became mandatory in 1920 (Lott and Kenny, 1999; Braun and 
Kvanicka, 2013). We use these restrictions to capture over-time and across-state variation in 
the size of the electorate. From Table 2, it is clear, however, that these restrictions had very 
little impact on the secret ballot. We must, again, conclude that there is little evidence 
supporting the franchise hypothesis. 
We use the share of land held by the 20 percent largest farms (land inequality) to 
                                                 
23The factor loading are 0.9291 (for income), 0.9063 (for schooling) and 0.8703 (for urbanization). 
 
Page 23 of 58
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/comppolstud
Comparative Political Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
24 
 
capture landholding inequality (Galor et al., 2009). Information on this share is only available 
from 1880, so we lose over half the observations when we include it in the specification 
shown in column seven of Table 2. Yet, landholding inequality is highly significant and 
exerts a negative impact on the secret ballot. This is in line with the findings of Ziblatt (2008) 
and Ansell and Samuels (2010; 2015) in other contexts. We find little evidence that scale 
effects or social learning mattered amongst the US states. 
In appendix S4 in the supplementary material, we discuss a number of additional 
robustness checks. This includes instrumental variable estimation based on the same strategy 
as for the Western Europe plus off-shoots sample. The results are consistent with a causal 
interpretation of the relationship between modernization and secret ballot. Kuo and Teorell 
(2013) report independent evidence which further supports such an interpretation and 
suggests that the Australian ballot reduced vote buying and intimidation in US state elections 
between 1860 and 1930. Moreover, the case study of Stokes et al. (2013, chapter 8) also 
corroborates the hypothesis that modernization helped end clientelism in the USA. 
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Table 2: The effect of modernization of the probability of secret ballot in US states, 1840-1950. Dependent variable: reform 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
log(real income per worker) 1.488***   1.239**  1.194** 0.601 
 [3.616]   [2.374]  [2.300] [1.016] 
Average years of schooling  0.525***  0.324*  0.311* 0.784*** 
  [3.734]  [1.910]  [1.843] [3.047] 
Urbanization rate   0.0218** -0.00661  -0.00492 0.0175 
   [2.046] [-0.384]  [-0.288] [0.966] 
First principal component     0.581***   
     [2.985]   
Women's suffrage 0.205 -0.122 0.106 0.156 0.195 0.187 -0.168 
 [0.455] [-0.264] [0.215] [0.331] [0.426] [0.399] [-0.278] 
Literacy test -0.84 -0.876 -0.864 -0.775 -0.849 -0.717 -0.502 
 [-1.212] [-1.191] [-1.327] [-1.086] [-1.276] [-1.011] [-0.934] 
Poll taxes -0.307 -0.45 -0.57 -0.254 -0.335 -0.203 -0.324 
 [-0.817] [-0.911] [-1.358] [-0.614] [-0.881] [-0.495] [-0.637] 
Land inequality       -31.1*** 
       [-3.670] 
log(population) -0.068 -0.28*** -0.201 -0.0877 -0.118 -0.104 -0.109 
 [-0.651] [-2.620] [-1.481] [-1.027] [-1.247] [-1.228] [-0.923] 
Learning -0.055 -4.292 -12.19 -5.353 -9.686 -5.582 9.758 
 [-0.005] [-0.363] [-0.941] [-0.385] [-0.771] [-0.404] [0.813] 
 
 
       
Joint significance of the 
modernization variables 
   20.7***  20.1*** 18.1*** 
Joint significance of the 
suffrage variables 
2.33 2.02 3.40 1.72 2.70 1.57 1.49 
Observations 2,239 2,214 2,251 2,186 2,186 2,186 738 
Number of states 45
a
 48 47
b
 44 44 44 44 
Estimation method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Rare 
events 
Logit 
        
Notes: Robust z-statistics correcting for clustering by state in brackets; a. Income data are missing for South and North Dakota and Oklahoma; b. Urbanization is missing for 
Idaho. All estimations control for duration dependence. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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4  Turnout and vote buying 
 
The evidence presented so far supports the view that modernization systematically 
affects the timing of the secret ballot. The underlying mechanism, however, remains unclear. 
In our theory, the causal link runs through the vote market. The available quantitative 
evidence on the operation of vote markets comes from a handful of insightful studies of 
particular markets.
24
 We provide new evidence on the interaction between modernization and 
the secret ballot by testing the turnout interaction hypothesis. The logic behind this 
hypothesis is that modernization gradually reduces the volume of trade in the vote markets 
operating under open ballot and that the secret ballot, in one go, elimintes (most of) what 
remains of these markets. As argued, e.g., by Converse (1974), Rusk (1974) and Heckelman 
(1995), this reduces electoral turnout. The elimination of the vote market is, however, not the 
only possible explanation for a fall in turnout after secret ballot. For example, it is possible 
that there is a shift from vote buying towards negative turnout buying (i.e., to pay expected 
opposition voters to stay home) after a reform. The seminal study by Cox and Kousser (1981, 
p. 656) of newspaper reports in New York State about instances of electoral corruption before 
and after the introduction of the secret ballot in 1890 provides examples of this. It is also 
possible that turnout will increase as a consequence of the secret ballot. This would be the 
case if the expressive benefit of voting shoots up by making the act of voting private or if the 
secret ballot “protects” voters and gives them the freedom to vote how they like. A possible 
example of this is Imperial Germany where the adoption of the secret ballot was correlated 
with an increase in turnout. Turnout could also increase if parties start using “brokers” to 
deliver blocks of votes (Stokes et al., 2013). The idea is that party leaders can contract with 
those brokers, who themselves use personal connections and knowledge of individuals to 
foster favorable turnout. This leads to positive turnout buying and if this is taking place at a 
sufficiently large scale, then turnout would not fall as a consequence of the secret ballot. We 
notice, however, that all these additional effects (which are not captured by our model) 
operate ex post, i.e., after the ballot has become secret. Our theory and the turnout interaction 
hypothesis is about what happens to the vote market and turnout ex ante, i.e., while the ballot 
is still open. What we argue is that the fall in turnout, documented by Heckelman (1995), is 
                                                 
24 Ziblatt (2009) studies electoral corruption in Imperial Germany between 1871 and 1912; Cox and Kousser (1981) study voting buying in 
rural areas of New York state in 1890s; Baland and Robinson (2008) study the vote market in Chile in the 1950s; Stokes (2005) studies vote 
buying in Argentina in 2002; and Collier and Vicente (2012) study electoral corruption in a number of contemporaneous African countries. 
Leemann and Mares (2011) and Mares (2015, chapter 6) study bills demanding reform of balloting rules in Prussia and link the demand for 
secrecy to district characteristics. 
Page 26 of 58
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/comppolstud
Comparative Political Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
27 
 
smaller in polities which have undergone significant modernization in the years before ballot 
reform than in polities that have not. This would also be true if there is a switch to negative 
turnout buying after the reform. If, on the other hand, turnout is encouraged by the secret 
ballot because of changes in expressive benefits, positive turnout buying or the development 
of broker-mediated forms of clientelism, then the prediction from the model would be that the 
this increase would be bigger in places where modernization is more progressed. In all cases, 
the point we want to stress is that modernization reduces turnout under open voting by 
reducing vote buying. We test this on a sample of US states from 1870 to 1950 and on a 
sample of parliamentary constituencies in Great Britain before and after the Ballot Act of 
1872.
25
 
 
4.1  The US states 
 
For the sample of US states, we extend Heckelman’s (1995) baseline model for the 
voter turnout rate in gubernatorial elections in the 48 contiguous US states, and estimate the 
following panel model:  
 (𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝛽0𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝑍𝑖𝑡𝛽3 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡,    (17) 
where 𝑖 represents a state, 𝑡 represents elections (from 1870 to 1950), 𝐴𝐵𝑖𝑡 is a dummy 
variable equal to zero before the Australian ballot and equal to one after, 𝑀𝑖𝑡 is a 
“modernization” variable of interest (real income per capita, average years of schooling or 
urbanization rate), 𝑍𝑖𝑡 is a vector of additional control variables, and 𝛿𝑖 and 𝜂𝑡 are state and 
time fixed effects. The turnout interaction hypothesis predicts that 𝛽0 < 0 and 𝛽1 > 0. The 
hypothesis that modernization under open ballot reduces vote buying implies that 𝛽2 < 0. 
Table 3 reports the results. In column one, we reproduce Heckelman’s (1995) finding 
that the Australian ballot has a significant, negative effect on turnout, consistent with the 
hypothesis that before the Australian ballot turnout is kept high because of vote buying. 
Columns two to four report on specifications with the interaction between modernization and 
secret ballot. To facilitate interpretation, we introduce one interaction term at the time. The 
coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant in each specification. In column 
five, we include all three interactions simultaneously. They are less precisely estimated but 
                                                 
25 The turnout interaction hypothesis cannot be tested on the Western Europe plus off-shoots sample because the turnout data that exist are 
not comparable across time and space. The main problem is that plural voting was common and that the recorded number of votes does not 
correspond to the number of voters casting valid vote (the United Kingdom is the leading example of this). Another problem is that open 
voting by “show of hands” (used e.g., in parts of Denmark till 1901) as opposite to an open ballot system based on color cards (used in many 
US states) makes it virtually impossible to obtain credible turnout data for the majority of European countries in the sample. 
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two of them remain significant at the ten percent level and they are jointly significant at the 
one percent level. The turning points for the modernization variables are all within sample 
and are indicated at the bottom of the table along with the observed range for each variable. 
We can, for example, imagine a state which starts with a low education level but expands 
education over the years. If this state happened to introduce the Australian ballot early, the 
consequence would be a fairly large drop in turnout, but if it adopts later the drop will be 
smaller and eventually turnout might even increase. The last effect is not explained by our 
model because the expressive benefit of voting is constant. In practice this benefit may 
increase when voting becomes secret. This produces a countervailing effect that could 
dominate in cases where the importance of the pre-Australian ballot vote market has already 
been curtailed by modernization. We observe that the point estimate on two of the 
modernization variables, real income per worker and urbanization rate are negative. This 
supports the view that modernization undermined the vote market prior to the Australian 
ballot. We note, however, that the positive point estimate on average years of schooling is 
inconsistent with this. We conjecture that this variable is picking up a positive correlation 
between the expressive value of voting and education that dominates any effect running 
through the vote market. Overall, these results corroborate the hypothesis that modernization 
undermines the vote market. 
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Table 3: The effect of the interaction between modernization and secret ballot on the turnout 
rate in 48 US states 1870-1950. 
Dependent variable: Turnout rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Australian ballot -5.589* -164.3*** -27.37*** -7.896* -133.3** 
 [-1.96] [-4.01] [-3.148] [-1.85] [2.29] 
Australian ballot* 
real income per worker 
 
17.50*** 
 
 12.53* 
  [4.13]   [1.76] 
Australian ballot* 
average years of schooling  
 
 
5.135***  3.07 
  
 
[3.23]  [1.59] 
Australian ballot* 
urbanization rate 
 
  
0.15* 0.005 
    [1.68] [0.04] 
Average years of schooling  4.31*** 1.84 3.81** 3.246** 
  [2.84] [1.13] [2.09] [2.06] 
Real income per worker  -20.48*** -9.83** -13.53*** -15.76** 
  [-4.48] [-2.55] [-3.50] [-2.27] 
Urbanization rate  -0.49** -0.54*** -0.50*** -0.56** 
  [-2.50] [-2.77] [-2.78] [-2.58] 
Women's suffrage -13.33*** -11.56*** -9.53** -11.33*** -10.28*** 
 [-4.23] [-3.47] [-2.43] [-3.00] [-3.05] 
Poll tax -19.04*** -14.61*** -15.53*** -15.85*** -13.98*** 
 [-6.03] [-5.54] [-5.53] [-5.19] [-5.10] 
Literacy test -8.29*** -4.62* -5.63** -6.44** -4.59* 
 [-2.87] [-1.68] [-2.05] [-2.16] [-1.72] 
Joint significance of the  
interaction terms 
    5.34*** 
R-squared 0.79 0.82 0.82 0.81 0.83 
Turning point n/a 9.38 5.33 52.64 Not reported 
Notes: Robust z-statistics correcting for clustering by state in brackets (i.e., we allow the errors to be correlated 
over time within states, but not between states).  State and year fixed effects included. Number of states is 48; 
Total number of observations are 1408. Specification (1) corresponds to the baseline model in Heckelman 
(1995, table 4). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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4.2  The Ballot Act of 1872 
 
The Second Reform Act of 1867 was followed five years later, in 1872, by the Ballot 
Act which introduced the Australian ballot in elections to the British House of Commons. We 
use the Ballot Act as a quasi-natural experiment.
26
 We study electoral turnout patterns at the 
constituency level in the general elections in 1868 and 1874, both of which were conducted 
according to the new franchise and district rules laid down in 1867, but under different ballot 
conditions. To test the turnout interaction hypothesis, we proxy modernization with the 
number of inhabitants per house in each constituency (𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡) which is closely related to 
the degree of urbanization.
27
 The outcome variable (𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡) records the number of voters 
who voted in constituency 𝑖 in election 𝑡 for 𝑡 ∈ {1868,1874}. We consider the following 
model for 𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡:  
𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝛼1𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 
                                  +𝛼4𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,                                                                     (18) 
where 𝑅1868 = 0 and 𝑅1874 = 1 indicate that the reform of the ballot took place between 
1868 and 1874, 𝛼𝑖 is a constituency specific fixed effect, 𝜈𝑡 is an aggregate time effect, 
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the number of registered voters. We allow 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 to have a direct impact on 
turnout, in addition to its interaction with the ballot reform. Taking the first difference of 
equation (18), we get  
 Δ𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 = (𝑣1874 − 𝑣1868 + 𝛼1) + 𝛼2𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖1874 + 𝛼3Δ𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 
 +𝛼4Δ(𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + (𝜀𝑖1874 − 𝜀𝑖1868).                                                               (19) 
Clearly, the direct effect of the reform (𝛼1), which we expect to be negative, cannot be 
identified independently of the common time effect. However, we can recover the interaction 
effect between the reform dummy variable and the indicator of modernization and test 
whether 𝛼2 > 0. We can also test whether turnout was lower in places that experienced an 
increase in population density between the two elections, i.e., if 𝛼3 < 0. Finally, we expect 
that the number of electors affects turnout positively, i.e. 𝛼4 > 0. 
Unfortunately, we only know the votes polled for each candidate and in constituencies 
                                                 
26 Berlinski and Dewan (2011) use a similar design to study the rise of the Liberal Party in Britain after 1867. 
27 To check the validity of using population density as a measure of urbanization and modernization more generally, we have undertaken 
three tests. First, in so far as population density and economic development are related, we would expect a positive correlation between 
population growth in the past and population density. In our sample, this correlation is extremely strong. This demonstrates that the 
constituencies with the highest population density were those which had grown most in the preceding decade. Second, our sample of one-
seat constituencies is concentrated amongst the smaller constituencies. We have checked that the average population density in our sample 
(5.6) is lower than the density in a sample of towns with more than 50.000 inhabitants (which, excluding London, is 6.0). Third, we have 
checked using data from the 1871 Census that population density in “rural towns" with less than 5,000 inhabitants is lower than in “urban 
towns” with more than 50,000 inhabitants. 
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with more than one seat, voters could cast as many votes as there were seats (Craig, 1977). 
Consequently, the number of votes is not, in general, equal to the number of voters. However, 
for the constituencies with only one seat, the number of votes is equal to the number of voters 
who turned out to vote, and our test is based on a sub-sample of 65 one-seat constituencies. 
The estimation results are  
 Δ𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 = −263
(−1.57)
+ 61.5
(1.92)
𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖1874 − 614
(−2.09)
Δ𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 0.47
(5.31)
Δ𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡, (20) 
where the figures in parentheses are (robust and clustered) z-statistics. The combined 
estimate of the reform and the aggregate time effect is negative, consistent with a post-reform 
drop in turnout, but not statistically significant. More importantly, the coefficient on density 
is positive with a p-value of 0.06. Consistent with the turnout interaction hypothesis, this 
suggests that the vote market, before the reform, was more vibrant in places that were less 
densely populated. This conclusion is supported by the negative coefficient on change in 
density which indicates that urbanization undermined the voting market and caused turnout to 
fall. Overall, the results are consistent with the causal mechanism suggested by our theory 
and they are corroborated by the insightful case study by Stokes et al. (2013, chapter 8) which 
concludes that the reason why political parties in Britain adopted legislation to limit electoral 
corruption and vote buying was that industrialization had made vote buying less 
economical.
28
 
 
5  Alternative mechanisms and theories 
 
All our empirical tests are consistent with the hypothesis that modernization paves the 
way for secret ballot. Our theory emphasizes the interaction between vote markets and 
modernization as the underlying causal mechanism. This is, however, not the only possibility 
and in this section, we evaluate the plausibility of alternatives channels through which 
modernization might have triggered ballot reform. 
First, while we stress the effect of modernization on demand and supply in a 
competitive market for votes, Stokes et al. (2013, pp. 179-180) emphasize the importance of 
brokers, such as party agents, and the way modernization may reduce the value of 
clientelism. In particular, they explain that “poverty may increase the returns to clientelism 
by making voters (who on average will have larger marginal utilities of income in poorer 
                                                 
28 Kam (2013) studies the prices of votes in Britain and finds that they fell after the secret ballot was introduced in 1872. This suggests that 
vote buying became less important as a consequence of the reform. 
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societies) more responsive to transfers, whereas growth of average income weakens these 
returns and thus increases the incentives of brokers to extract rents.” Given the data 
marshalled for this project, it is, however, not possible to discriminate effectively between the 
vote buying mechanism and broker-mediation mechanism. Both mechanisms are plausible 
and both predict a positive relationship between secret ballot and modernization and, as such, 
our evidence is consistent with both and we view them as complementary rather than as 
substitutes. Modernization may also affect the old regime elites in other ways than proposed 
by our theory where they are “reluctant” reformers. In Prussia, for example, conservative 
elements of the elite supported secret ballot in the 19th century presumably because 
“intimidation of voters in the rural districts of the East was more than matched by the SPD 
intimidation of shopkeepers, artisans and non-Socialist voters in the cities of the West” 
(Retallack, 1988, p. 164). In fact, between 1869 and 1912, 18 bills were proposed in the 
Reichstag to introduce elements of secrecy in voting. Mares (2015, chapter 6) shows that bills 
were sponsored by the politicians who were elected in districts with a high degree of 
occupational fragmention. This suggests that economic development through its effect on 
economic diversity created demand from within the German elite for ballot reform. Along 
similar lines Elklit (1988, p. 300) notes that voters of all parties, including the conservative 
and social democratic party, experienced electoral coercion in Denmark prior to the secret 
ballot. Depending on shifts in the relative ability of parties to coerce voters, subsets of the 
elite might, therefore, see ballot reform as an expedient way to gain electoral advantage. This 
line of reasoning suggests an alternative way that modernization may drive ballot reform not 
present in our model: modernization empowers the working class and create economic 
diversification which make the old elite favor ballot reform simply because intimidation 
becomes unworkable. One way to evaluate the power of this mechanism in our context is to 
include the share of left-wing party seats in our cross-country model for secret ballot adoption 
and test whether it has a positive effect. We find that it does, but the effect is statistically 
insignificant. Since the coefficient on GDP per capita remains positive and significant this 
demonstrates that modernization must work through other channels than expedient elite 
support for reform.
29
 
Second, another consequence of modernization, which is stressed by, for example, 
Kitschelt and Wilkingson (2007) and Keefer and Vlaicu (2008), is the emergence of 
“modern” political parties. That is, parties with either credible policy platforms which 
                                                 
29 The social democratic parties in both Denmark and Germany were in favor of secret ballot, see Elklit (1988, p. 302) and Schorske (1955, 
p. 3). The results are reported in the supplementary appendix Table S5. 
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individual politicians respect or with organizational structures that enable monitoring of new 
forms of exchange (other than outright vote buying) between the party and the voters. Once a 
modern party is established, the value of open voting is reduced, either because the party can 
contest elections with programmatic policy platforms or because it can support forms of 
clientelism that do not require open voting. It is, therefore, possible that it is the emergence of 
modern political parties that triggers secret ballot, and that modernization operates through 
this channel. To investigate this, we determine the approximate year in which political parties 
with nation-wide organizations started to contest elections emerged in our Western Europe 
plus off-shoots sample. The recorded timing pattern relative to the timing of secret ballot 
reform provides mixed support for this hypothesis (see supplementary material appendix 
Table S1). In some countries, modern parties did indeed emerge prior to the introduction of 
the secret ballot (e.g., in Germany and Denmark), but in others they did not (e.g., in the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands). We add a dummy variable capturing the year in which 
modern political parties emerged to the baseline specification.  We find that this variable 
denoted by ”effective parties” itself has a positive, but insignificant effect on the probability 
of secret ballot reform. Importantly, the positive effect of the modernization variables 
remains statistically significant.
30
 This suggests that the modernization effect did not 
primarily operate through the emergence of modern political parties. 
Third, the historical narrative from the USA suggests that the old regime elites played 
a proactive role in ballot reform. In fact, it has been suggested that they used the Australian 
ballot to disenfranchise illiterates among foreign born citizens and blacks in order to obtain a 
partisan advantage (Keyssar, 2000, Heckelman, 2000). If this mechanism is important, we 
would expect higher support for the Australian ballot in states with lower levels of education 
which would imply higher levels of illiteracy. This does not seem to be borne out by the data 
as years of schooling is positively correlated with the probability of ballot reform in the 48 
US states. 
Forth, modernization may encourage the formation of “public opinion” and induce a 
fall in the cost of mass communication. Stokes et al. (2013) see the later as a consequence of 
rising literacy and increasing years of schooling. In our analysis of the 48 US states, we find 
that GDP per capita and average years of schooling are both significant. This, on the one 
hand, is consistent with the possibility that modernization works through a fall in the cost of 
mass communication. On the other hand, this cannot be the whole story as income growth has 
                                                 
30The result is reported in the supplementary appendix Table S5. 
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an independent effect. Moreover, Stokes et al. (2013, p. 238) suggest that campaigning in 
newspapers did not become common till the first decades of the 20
th
 century. We have, 
therefore, checked whether the adoptions of secret ballot after 1900 drive the correlation 
between ballot reform and income in our samples and find that it does not. 
Finally, our theory puts a strong emphasis on vote buying and less emphasis on 
intimidation and coercion. Yet, there are plenty of historical examples of how intimidation 
and coercion corrupted elections. Our theory offers some scope for discriminating between 
the two forms of electoral corruption. While the effect on turnout of secret ballot is 
unambiguously negative if vote markets are important, the effect is less clear if electoral 
corruption takes the form of intimidation and coercion. In that case, voter turnout may 
actually increase after the Australian ballot was introduced. In contrast to Heckelman (1995) 
who finds a clear fall in turnout amongst US states after the vote became secret, the cross-
country analysis by Przeworski (2008) shows that the effect can be positive. This suggests 
that context matters and that both vote buying and intimidation played a role. Importantly, 
however, whether the direct effect on turnout is negative or positive does not matter for the 
hypothesis that modernization causes secret ballot adoption. The reason, as argued by Stokes 
et al. (2013), is that coercion and intimidation are less effective means of controlling the 
electorate with higher levels of economic development. Accordingly, whether modernization 
works through the vote market or through a reduction in the returns to coercion and 
clientelism, the outcome is that modernization makes secret ballot more likely. Our evidence 
strongly suggest that this was the case. 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
We “ unbundle”  the concept of democracy in order to evaluate in a more nuanced 
way the interplay between modernization and democratization. Our event history studies of 
the introduction of the secret ballot demonstrate a remarkably robust relationship between 
modernization and its adoption. This finding is important because it grants the forces of 
urbanization, rising education standards, and income growth a role in explaining political 
development. The role is more limited than envisaged by Lipset (1959), but we contend that 
modernization, while probably not causally linked to the timing of the major suffrage reforms 
and thus to the evolution of the overall package of democratic institutions, was a causal factor 
in getting the secret ballot introduced. 
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Uncovering the precise mechanism behind this aggregate result requires more refined 
work than what we have presented here. We have proposed one mechanism based on the 
logic of a competitive vote market. The reported evidence on the interplay between 
modernization, ballot reform and turnout is consistent with this mechanism, but it does not 
rule out that other forms of clientelism could also have played a major role. More work is 
clearly needed to gain a fuller understanding of what is behind the relationship between 
modernization and the introduction of secret ballot. 
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Appendix S1: Proofs and discussion of assumptions 
 
One party only buys votes. The two first order conditions are  
 
𝑛𝑗,~𝑗
𝑏 : 
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
(𝑣) ≤
𝜐𝑗?̂?Δ
𝜆~𝑗𝛼𝑗(Δ +𝑀)
+
Δ
2𝛼𝑗
≡ 𝐾𝑗 . (21) 
The left-hand side is the same. If 𝐾𝐸 ≠ 𝐾𝑅, then at most one of these equations can be 
satisfied with equality. Since the function 𝑔 is strictly concave (so that 
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
(𝑣) is decreasing in 
𝑣), it is the equation associated with the minimum of 𝐾𝐸 and 𝐾𝑅 that may admit an interior 
solution. Under Assumption 1, 𝐾𝐸 < 𝐾𝑅 and 𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ > 0 and 𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏∗ = 0. The second order 
conditions, including  
 
Υ ≡
Δ +𝑀
?̂?
𝛼𝐸
2
∂2𝑔
∂𝑣2
< 0 (22) 
are satisfied. 
 The continuation values of veto and reform. To calculate the continuation payoff 
for party 𝐸 following a veto, let 𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝐸) be the expected present value for party 𝐸 at the 
beginning of a period if the present ballot regime is OB and it wins the next election, and let 
the corresponding expected present value if it loses be 𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝑅). Under the assumption that 
party 𝐸 will veto when needed, we can write the value of calling a veto at the end of the 
current period as follows:  
 𝑊𝐸(veto) = −𝜌 + 𝛽𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝐸) + 𝛽(1 − 𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵)𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝑅), (23) 
where  
 𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝐸) = 𝑢𝐸(𝐸) + 𝑀 − 𝑣𝐸Δ𝜆𝑅
−1𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ (. ) + 𝛽𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝐸)
+ 𝛽(1 − 𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵)𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝑅), 
 
 𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝑅) = 𝑢𝐸(𝑅) − 𝑣𝐸Δ𝜆𝑅
−1𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ (. ) − 𝜌 + 𝛽𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝐸) 
                             +𝛽(1 − 𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵)𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝑅). 
 
We can solve these two equations for 𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝐸) and 𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝑅), which yields  
 
 𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝐸)
=
(1 − 𝛽(1 − 𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵)(𝑢𝐸(𝐸) + 𝑀) + 𝛽(1 − 𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵)(𝑢𝐸(𝑅) − 𝜌) − 𝑣𝐸Δ𝜆𝑅
−1𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ (. )
1 − 𝛽
, 
 
 
 𝑉(𝑂𝐵, 𝑅)
=
(1 − 𝛽𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵)(𝑢𝐸(𝑅) − 𝜌) + 𝛽𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵(𝑢𝐸(𝑀) +𝑀) − 𝑣𝐸Δ𝜆𝑅
−1𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ (. )
1 − 𝛽
. 
 
Substituting these two equations into equation (23) and simplifying give equation (14) in the 
text. The continuation value following a permanent transition to secret ballot can be 
constructed in a similar fashion, but we may simply note that the per period expected utility 
of the elite is equal to  
 (1 − 𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵)𝑢𝐸(𝑅) + 𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵(𝑢𝐸(𝐸) + 𝑀) 
and that this is repeated for all periods starting one period ahead and is, therefore, discounted 
back to the present by 
𝛽
1−𝛽
. This gives equation (13) in the text. 
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 Comparative statics. Total differentiation of equation (10) yields: 
 
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗
∂𝛼𝐸
= −
1
?̂?
∂𝑔
∂𝑣 (Δ +𝑀)
Υ
> 0;
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗
∂𝜆𝑅
= −
Δ𝜐𝐸
𝜆𝑅
2Υ
> 0;
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗
∂𝑁𝑅
= 0. (24) 
Substituting 𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗  along with the equilibrium values of electoral turnout from equation (6) into 
equation (12) gives 
 𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵 = 𝑓𝐸(𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ (𝛼𝐸 , 𝜆𝑅),0, 𝑛𝐸
∗ (0, 𝑁𝐸), 𝑛𝑅
∗ (𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ (𝛼𝐸 , 𝜆𝑅),𝑁𝑅)). (25) 
The comparative statics results are 
 ∂𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵
∂𝛼𝐸
=
1
?̂?
[
Δ𝜐𝐸?̂?
𝜆𝑅(Δ + 𝑀)
]
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗
∂𝛼𝐸
+
1
?̂?
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ > 0, (26) 
 
  
∂𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵
∂𝜆𝑅
=
1
?̂?
[
Δ𝜐𝐸?̂?
𝜆𝑅(Δ + 𝑀)
]
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗
∂𝜆𝑅
> 0, (27) 
 
 ∂𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵
∂𝑁𝑅
=
1
?̂?
[
−1
2
∂𝑛𝑅
∗
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗
+ 𝛼𝐸
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
]
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗
∂𝑁𝑅
−
1
2?̂?
∂𝑛𝑅
∗
∂𝑁𝑅
= −
1 − 𝑐
2?̂?
< 0, (28) 
where we, in each case, use the first order condition for 𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗  and the relevant comparative 
statics from equation (24) to sign the effects. Rewrite equation (15) and define 
 𝐷(𝛼𝐸 , 𝜆𝑅 , 𝑁𝑅) ≡ 𝛽(𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵 − 𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵)(Δ + 𝑀) − 𝛽𝑣𝐸Δ𝜆𝑅
−1𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ (. )
− (1 − 𝛽𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵)𝜌. 
(29) 
Since the elite vetoes only if 𝐷(𝛼𝐸 , 𝜆𝑅 , 𝑁𝑅) ≥ 0, any factor that reduces 𝐷(. ) makes a veto 
less likely and ballot reform more likely. The comparative statics are 
 
 ∂𝐷
∂𝛼𝐸
= 𝛽
∂𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵
∂𝛼𝐸
(Δ + 𝑀) − 𝛽𝑣𝐸Δ𝜆𝑅
−1
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗
∂𝛼𝐸
+ 𝛽
∂𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵
∂𝛼𝐸
𝜌 
        = 𝛽(Δ + 𝑀)
1
?̂?
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ + 𝛽
∂𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵
∂𝛼𝐸
𝜌 > 0 
(30) 
  
 ∂𝐷
∂𝜆𝑅
= 𝛽
∂𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵
∂𝜆𝑅
(Δ + 𝑀) − 𝛽𝑣𝐸Δ𝜆𝑅
−1
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗
∂𝜆𝑅
+ 𝛽𝑣𝐸Δ𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ 𝜆𝑅
−2 + 𝛽
∂𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵
∂𝜆𝑅
𝜌 
        = 𝛽𝑣𝐸Δ𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗ 𝜆𝑅
−2 + 𝛽
∂𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵
∂𝜆𝑅
𝜌 > 0, 
 
(31) 
where we use the first order condition for 𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗  and the results in equations (26) to (27) to get 
the second line of each expression. Moreover, we find that 
 ∂𝐷
∂𝑁𝑅
= 𝛽(Δ +𝑀)(
∂𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵
∂𝑁𝑅
−
∂𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵
∂𝑁𝑅
) + 𝛽
∂𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵
∂𝑁𝑅
𝜌 = 𝛽
∂𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵
∂𝑁𝑅
𝜌 < 0 (32) 
since 
∂𝑓𝐸
𝑆𝐵
∂𝑁𝑅
=
∂𝑓𝐸
𝑂𝐵
∂𝑁𝑅
= −
1−𝑐
2?̂?
 because 
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏∗
∂𝑁𝑅
= 0. 
 
 Simplifying assumptions. 
  
1.  Voter type is observable. We assume that the parties can observe who the opposition 
voters are and so offer them their reservation price in exchange for their vote. The other 
extreme is to assume that the parties cannot observe who is who but know the reservation 
prices of the various types and so that 𝑝𝑅 < 𝑝𝐸. In stage 𝐶, party 𝐸 can offer 𝑝𝑅. At this price 
only voters of type 𝑅 will sell. Party 𝐸 can get them to self-select and so the probability that it 
offers a bribe to an opposition voter is 1. Party 𝑅 needs to offer 𝑝𝐸 to induce voters of type 𝐸 
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to sell. At this price, both types are willing to sell and so the party 𝑅 must buy votes at 
random. The probability that it buys a voter of type 𝐸 is 
1
𝑛𝑅+𝑛𝐸
. In stage 𝐵, we maintain the 
assumption that voters expect that everyone shows up when they calculate their own chances 
of being offered a bribe. A voter of type 𝑅 expects to get a bribe from party 𝑅 with 
probability 
𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏
𝑁𝑅
 or from party 𝐸 with probability 
𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏
𝑁𝑅+𝑁𝐸
 (this assumes he cannot get bribed 
twice) and his expected bribe income is 𝑝𝑅
𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏
𝑁𝑅
+ 𝑝𝐸
𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏
𝑁𝑅+𝑁𝐸
. A voter of type 𝐸 expects to get a 
bribe from party 𝑅 with probability 
𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏
𝑁𝑅+𝑁𝐸
. The turnouts of voters of the two groups are:  
 
𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵 = 𝑁𝐸(1 − 𝑐) + 𝑁𝐸
𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏
𝑁𝑅 + 𝑁𝐸
𝑝𝐸𝜆𝐸 , 
𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵 = 𝑁𝑅(1 − 𝑐) + 𝑁𝑅𝜆𝑅 (𝑝𝑅
𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏
𝑁𝑅
+ 𝑝𝐸
𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏
𝑁𝑅 + 𝑁𝐸
), 
 
where 𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵 + 𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵 = (𝑁𝑅 + 𝑁𝐸)(1 − 𝑐) + Δ(𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏 + 𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 ). 
In stage A, the two parties now internalize both the effect on turnout and on their chance of 
buying an influential vote. We let  
 
𝑣 = 𝛼𝐸𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏 − 𝛼𝑅
𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏
𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵 + 𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵.  
The first order condition will now have to take into account that 𝑣 is influenced by total 
turnout which is influenced by voting buying with  
 ∂𝑣
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏 = 𝛼𝐸 + 𝛼𝑅
𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏
(𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵 + 𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵)2
Δ,  
 ∂𝑣
∂𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 = −𝛼𝑅
(𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵 + 𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵) − 𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 Δ
(𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵 + 𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵)2
.  
We write the first order conditions as  
 ∂𝑣
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
≤ 𝛼𝐸𝐾𝐸 ,  
 
−
∂𝑣
∂𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
≤ 𝛼𝑅𝐾𝑅 ,  
with 𝐾𝐸 < 𝐾𝑅 defined in Appendix A. Conjecture that only party 𝐸 will buy. Then 
∂𝑣
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏 = 𝛼𝐸 
and 
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
= 𝐾𝐸. Look at  
 
𝛼𝑅
(𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵 + 𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵) − 𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 Δ
(𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵 + 𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵)2
𝐾𝐸 ≤ 𝛼𝑅𝐾𝑅 .  
If 
(𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵+𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵)−𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 Δ
(𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵+𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵)
2 < 1, which it is if (𝑛𝑅
𝑂𝐵 + 𝑛𝐸
𝑂𝐵) > 1, then the conjecture is correct and 
only party 𝐸 bribes. In this case, all the relevant comparative statics derive from 
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
= 𝐾𝐸 and 
are exactly as before. 
 
2.  Rational expectations about turnout. If voters believe that their chance of getting a bribe is 
proportional to turnout rather than to the size of their group, then the expected utility value of 
the bribe is  
 
𝑢𝑗
𝑒 =
𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏
𝑛𝑗
𝑝𝑗𝜆𝑗 . (33) 
At equilibrium the expected turnout must be equal to actual turnout, so turnout for group 𝑗 is 
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defined by  
 
𝑛𝑗 = 𝑁𝑗 (1 − 𝑐 +
𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏
𝑛𝑗
𝑝𝑗𝜆𝑗), (34) 
with the solution
31
  
 
𝑛𝑗
∗(𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏 , 𝑁𝑗) =
1
2
𝑁𝑗(1 − 𝑐) +
1
2
√𝑁𝑗
2(1 − 𝑐)2 + 4𝑁𝑗𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏 𝑝𝑗𝜆𝑗 . (35) 
The main difference between this and the case considered in the text is that the marginal 
effect of bribery on turnout is not independent of 𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏 . Under the assumption that  
 𝑝𝑅𝜐𝐸?̂?
𝛼𝐸(Δ𝐸 +𝑀)
+
1
2
∂𝑛𝑅
∗
∂𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏 <
𝑝𝐸𝜐𝑅?̂?
𝛼𝑅(Δ𝑅 +𝑀)
+
1
2
∂𝑛𝐸
∗
∂𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 ,  
it remains true that only party 𝐸 is active in the vote market. All comparative static results 
continue to hold as long as vote buying is optimal. The only result that requires an additional 
assumption is the one regarding the effect of 𝑁𝑅 on the net value of a veto. 
 
3.  Δ𝐸 = Δ𝑅. Since these represent per capita benefits, the natural alternative is that Δ𝐸 > Δ𝑅, 
i.e., each member of the (small) elite stands to lose a lot more than each member of the 
(large) majority. All results go through when Δ𝐸 > Δ𝑅 because this simply increases the 
reservation price for elite voters. If, for some reason, Δ𝐸 < Δ𝑅, all results holds as long as this 
difference is not sufficient to violate Assumption 1. 
 
4.  Secret ballot as an absorbing state. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) make a similar 
assumption about franchise extensions to capture the notion that institutional reforms persist. 
If we allow for reversals, it is possible that there exist equilibria where the society fluctuates 
between the two ballot systems (this would for example be the case if 𝜌 = 0), but there will 
also exist parameter values such that a transition to secret ballot is permanent. It is a question 
of finding parameters such that party 𝐸 will not veto, while party 𝑅 will. 
 
5.  The vote buying technology. This is the critical assumption that leads to the asymmetric 
outcome in the vote market with at most one party buying. Other technologies lead to 
situations where both parties buy votes. This makes the analysis more blurred, but as long as 
one of the parties has a clear advantage under open ballot and the other has an advantage 
under secret ballot, the logic of reform continues to apply and modernization continues to 
undermine the value of the vote market by pushing up prices and increasing transaction costs. 
 
6.  Buying back votes. In the main specification, we allow parties to target opposition voters, 
but not to ‘buy back’ supporters who have been offered a vote contract by the opposition. The 
logic of the model is not substantially affected by this restriction. The maintained assumption 
in the model is that vote contracts can be enforced, i.e., that the party that buys a vote can 
penalize the seller if the contract is broken. This means that a party that buys a vote back will 
have to compensate the voter for this cost. If we let the utility cost of the penalty that party 𝑗 
can impose on contracts which are broken be 𝑞𝑗. We need to introduce some extra notation. 
Let 𝑛𝑗𝑗
𝑏  be the number of voters of type 𝑗 that party 𝑗 buys back with 𝑛𝑗𝑗
𝑏 ≤ 𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏  and let the 
bribe prices that party 𝑅 offers to voters of type 𝐸 be 𝑝𝐸
𝑅 = 𝜆𝐸
−1Δ, the bribe price that 𝑅 offers 
to own voters to buy them back 𝑝𝑅
𝑅 = 𝜆𝑅
−1𝑞𝐸 and likewise for party 𝐸. The expected turnout 
of voters of type 𝑗 is  
 𝑛𝑗
𝑂𝐵 = 𝑁𝑗(1 − 𝑐) + (𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏 − 𝑛𝑗𝑗
𝑏 )𝑝𝑗
−𝑗𝜆𝑗 + 𝑛𝑗𝑗
𝑏 𝑝𝑗
𝑗𝜆𝑗 (36) 
                                                 
31 We disregard the negative root of the polynomial. 
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        = 𝑁𝑗(1 − 𝑐) + (𝑛~𝑗𝑗
𝑏 − 𝑛𝑗𝑗
𝑏 )Δ + 𝑛𝑗𝑗
𝑏 𝑞~𝑗 
and the vote productivity adjusted vote shares 
 𝑣 = 𝛼𝐸(max[𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏 − 𝑛𝑅𝑅
𝑏 , 0]) − 𝛼𝑅(max[𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 − 𝑛𝐸𝐸
𝑏 , 0]). (37) 
The objective functions of the two parties are 
 𝑓𝐸(Δ + 𝑀) − 𝑝𝑅
𝐸𝑣𝐸max[𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏 − 𝑛𝑅𝑅
𝑏 , 0]) − 𝑝𝐸
𝐸𝑣𝐸𝑛𝐸𝐸
𝑏  
−𝑓𝐸(Δ +𝑀) − 𝑝𝐸
𝑅𝑣𝑅max[𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 − 𝑛𝐸𝐸
𝑏 , 0]) − 𝑝𝑅
𝑅𝑣𝑅𝑛𝑅𝑅
𝑏 . 
(38) 
The first order condition associated with the four choice variables can be written as 
 
𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏 : 
1
?̂?
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
(𝑣) ≤
𝜐𝐸Δ
𝜆𝑅𝛼𝐸(Δ + 𝑀)
+
Δ
2?̂?𝛼𝐸
  with = if 𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏 > 0 (39) 
 
𝑛𝐸𝐸
𝑏 : 
1
?̂?
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
(𝑣) ≤
𝑣𝐸𝑞𝑅
𝜆𝐸𝛼𝑅(Δ + 𝑀)
+
(𝑞𝑅 − Δ)
2?̂?𝛼𝑅
  with = if 𝑛𝐸𝐸
𝑏 > 0 (40) 
 
𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 : 
1
?̂?
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
(𝑣) ≤
𝜐𝑅Δ
𝜆𝐸𝛼𝑅(Δ + 𝑀)
+
Δ
2?̂?𝛼𝑅
  with = if 𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 > 0 (41) 
 
𝑛𝑅𝑅
𝑏 : 
1
?̂?
∂𝑔
∂𝑣
(𝑣) ≤
𝑣𝑅𝑞𝐸
𝜆𝐸𝛼𝐸(Δ + 𝑀)
+
(𝑞𝐸 − Δ)
2?̂?𝛼𝐸
  with = if 𝑛𝑅𝑅
𝑏 > 0 (42) 
Under assumption A1, 𝑛𝐸𝑅
𝑏 > 0 and 𝑛𝑅𝐸
𝑏 = 0. That is, party 𝐸 bribes voters of type 𝑅, but 
party 𝑅 does not bribe voters of type 𝐸. Clearly, 𝑛𝐸𝐸
𝑏 = 0. However, it is possible that 
𝑛𝑅𝑅
𝑏 > 0, i.e., that party 𝑅 will bribe some of its voters, who have been targeted by party 𝐸, to 
get them to shift their vote back to it. This is ruled out if  
 𝑣𝐸Δ
𝜆𝑅(Δ + 𝑀)
+
Δ
2?̂?
<
𝑣𝑅𝑞𝐸
𝜆𝐸(Δ + 𝑀)
+
(𝑞𝐸 − Δ)
2?̂?
. (43) 
This condition is satisfied if the sanction that party 𝐸 can impose for breaking the initial vote 
contract between it and a voter of type 𝑅 (𝑞𝐸) is sufficiently large, and/or if the cost of raising 
funds for party 𝐸 is sufficiently low relative to party 𝑅 or if the marginal value of income is 
much lower for voters of type 𝐸 than for voters of type 𝑅. In this case, all the results stated in 
the text hold true. If the condition fails, the vote market will shot down, as party 𝐸 will stop 
buying votes because it foresees that party 𝑅 will buy them back. We notice that 
modernization may induce this by lowering 𝑞𝐸 – the sanction that party 𝐸 can impose for a 
broken vote contract may become less costly as alternative employment opportunities opens 
up for voters of type 𝑅.  
 
Appendix S2: Timing of the secret ballot 
 
For the timing of the secret ballot, we use the year in which the electoral law which 
introduced de facto secret ballot was passed by parliament.  
 
The Netherlands: 1849. Stuurman (1991, pp. 462-463) notes that “ in the autumn of 1849 
Thorbecke, the architect of the new constitution, was at last called upon to form a Cabinet 
and it was his government that produced the final Electoral law [...] There was a secret ballot 
in all elections.” 
New Zealand: 1870. “ Verbal voting lasted until 1870, when Parliament finally agreed to 
adopt the secret ballot. Each voter was given a printed ballot paper listing the candidates in 
their electorate. They marked the paper in private behind a screen and then deposited it into a 
locked ballot box”  (www.elections.org.nz/democracy/history/years.html). Mackie (2000) 
confirms this year. Przeworski (2010) dates the secret ballot to 1937. The reason for this is 
that Maoris were not granted the right to a secret ballot until then. 
United Kingdom: 1872. This was the year of the Ballot Act, which introduced the Australian 
Ballot (Asquith, 1888; Mackie, 2000, Seymour, 1915). 
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Switzerland: 1872. Hewitt (1977) and Engerman (2003). 
Canada: 1874. Pillon (2006) and Engerman (2003). 
Belgium: 1877. Seymour and Fray (1918, vol. II,  p. 193) and Mackie (2000). Przeworski 
(2010) dates it to 1879, but this is the first election in which it applied. 
Norway: 1884. Nerbørvik (1986). Some sources, e.g., Engerman (2003) and Przeworski 
(2010), give 1885, but this is the year of the first election conducted with secret ballot.  
United States: 1891. The dating of the secret ballot for senatorial elections in the USA is 
complicated by the fact that the ballot rules were decided at the state level. We use 1891 as 
the benchmark because the majority of states had adopted the secret ballot for senatorial 
elections in that year (Mackie, 2000). 
Denmark: 1901. Elkit (1988, p. 300) writes that secret ballot was finally approved in January 
and Seymour and Frary (1918, vol. II, p. 177) agree. In fact, the act was passed on 25th 
january, 1901 by the upper chamber (landstinget). It had already been approved by the lower 
chamber on 15th November, 1900. However, since final approval from the upper chamber 
was needed for the act to be passed, we use 1901 as the year of introduction (see Tilæg C til 
Rigsdagstidenden, 1901). 
Finland: 1906. “ The Parliament Act that came into force on 1 October 1906 was a 
monumental reform [...] The new Parliament Act called for Members of Parliament to be 
elected directly and by secret ballot according to a proportional system based on districts.”  
(http://web.eduskunta.fi/Resource.phx/parliament /aboutparliament/presentation/history.htx). 
Mackie (2000) and Przeworski (2010) give 1907, but this is the first election under the new 
rules. 
Sweden: 1907. Carstairs (1980). Esaiasson (1990) gives 1911 but this is the first election 
with secret ballot. Przeworski (2010) dates it to 1866. While it is true that the older and 
varying regulations often demanded the use of “sealed tickets”  (slutna sedlar), it was not till 
the election in 1911 that voting became de facto secret. 
Austria: 1907. (http://www.parlament.gv.at/) and Seymour and Frary (1918, vol. II, pp. 62-
63). 
Germany: 1913. Anderson (2000, p. 56) argues that the secret ballot was effective in 
Germany from 1913. Przeworski (2010) dates it to 1867 (i.e., from the constitution of the 
Northern German Confederation). The constitution of Imperial German, Article 20, 
guaranteed a secret ballot, but it was not Australian. The ballot papers were not printed 
centrally but by the candidates themselves. This made it possible by using different types of 
paper or by putting a mark on the outside of the ballot to monitor the votes. In 1903 a system 
of “sealed tickets”   whereby the votes were concealed in envelopes and the vote became 
partially secret (Ziblatt, 2009, p. 12). As pointed out by Anderson (1993, p. 1457) and Mares 
(2015) this, however, did not in many cases make the situation better as the return officer 
would collect the envelops in the order in which they were cast and in small constituencies it 
was therefore a simple matter to correlate the sequence of votes with the sequence of voters. 
Moreover, Anderson (2000, p. 55) notes that “ Experts in European elections processes 
claimed that the ballot envelope actually worsened the chances for secrecy” . In line with this, 
Ziblatt (2009, p. 17) observes that pettitions claimed violations of the secret ballot in both the 
1907 and 1912 elections. In 1913, a system based on mandatory electoral urns removed this 
loophole and we follow Anderson (2000, 56) and use 1913 to date when the ballot became de 
facto secret. It is, however, a matter of judgement if 1913 or 1903 is chosen and we note that 
the last election in Imperial Germany took place in 1912. We have checked that none of the 
results depends our choice of 1913 and included a discussion of this in appendix S4. 
France: 1913. France had semi-secret elections early in the 19th century, but it was not until 
1913 that it became effectively secret, e.g. Baland and Robinson (2008, p. 1738), Seymour 
and Frary (1918, vol. I, p. 379), Markoff (1999) and Crook and Crook (2007). The 
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constitution of 1795 included provisions for the secret ballot (and Przeworski (2010) dates it 
to 1820), but it is widely seen to have been ineffective because voters could write the name of 
their preferred candidate on their own ballot paper at home or receive a ballot in a distribution 
in the streets. As stressed by many authors (e.g. Seymour and Frary, 1918; Markoff, 1999; 
Mackie, 2000; Crook and Crook, 2007), this provided ample leeway for corruption and 
intimidation. For example, Seymour and Frary (1918, p. 379) note that the vote was de jure 
secret, but “ in practice almost as public as in Prussia, where it is oral.”  In 1913, the ballot 
rules were tidied up and although the ballot remained non-Australian, the reform is widely 
considered to have been effective in providing secrecy and weeding out most corrupt 
practices. 
US states: Heckelman (1995), Lott and Kenny (1999), Fredman (1968), and Ludington 
(1911). In some states, e.g., Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee, Texas, Missouri, 
and Wisconsin, the secret ballot was not initially applied uniformly throughout the entire state 
and the coding of these cases follows Lott and Kenny (1999) by coding years of statewide 
adoption of the Australian ballot. For example, Ludington (1911) notes that Kentucky 
enacted an Australian ballot law in 1888, but this only applied only to “ the election of certain 
city officers in the city of Louisville” . The first statewide Australian ballot law was enacted 
in 1892, and we use this date for Kentucky, though this choice make little difference for our 
results. Based on Ludington (1911), we make some corrections to the dates reported by Lott 
and Kenny (1999). First, Kentucky is coded as 1882, which is likely to be a typo as the year 
of statewide adoption was 1892. For Wisconsin, Lott and Kenny (1999) give 1894, but 
Luddington (1911, p. 78) says 1893. 
 
Tables S1 and S2 contain relevant institutional information for the two samples. 
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Appendix S3: Definitions and Sources 
 
Sample: Western Europe plus off-shoots 
 
real GDP per capita is real GDP in international 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars, adjusted for the 
impact of border changes, per capita. Source: Maddison (2003). 
 
urbanization rate is the percentage of the population living in towns with more than 20,000 
inhabitants. Missing values are interpolated linearly. Source: Banks (2003) and Mitchell 
(2003a,b). 
 
electorate/adult population is the electorate (for parliamentary/house elections) in percentage 
of the adult population. Data are only recorded in election years and assumed to be constant 
between elections. Suffrage is coded zero for periods without elections. Source: Flora et al. 
(1983), Mackie and Rose (1991), Mitchell (2003a,b), Cook and Paxton (1998), 
www.elections.org.nz, and www.elections.ca. 
  
gini coefficient is the Gini coefficient for income inequality. A value of zero (one) expresses 
total equality (inequality). Data are available with 20-year intervals and missing observations 
interpolated linearly. Source: Bourguignon and Morrisson (2001, 2002). 
  
learning is defined as a distance weighted average of secret ballot adoptions in other 
countries:  
𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 =∑ (1−√
15 − #𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗
15
)𝐴𝑗(𝑡),
𝑗
 
 
where 𝐴𝑗(𝑡) is 1 if country 𝑗 has adopted the secret ballot at time 𝑡 and zero otherwise. The 
variable #𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 is the number of common notes in the linguistic tree between country 
pair 𝑖 and 𝑗 with the maximum number of common notes being 15. Source: Fearon (2003) 
and own calculations. 
  
population is the total population in 1000s. Source: Mitchell (2003a,b) and Maddison (2003). 
 
Instrumental variables 
 
revolutionary threat is a weighted sum of revolutionary events taking place in other 
countries. The weights are the distance between the capitals of each pair of countries. Source: 
Aidt and Jensen (2014) and Tilly (1993). 
 
distance weighted GDP is a weighted sum of log GDP in other countries where the weights 
are the inverse distance (in kilometers) between the capitals of each pair of countries. Source: 
Maddison (2003) and own calculations. 
 
Variables used in robustness checks 
 
Districts (MPs) is the number of MPs elected to the main national parliament and is used as a 
proxy for the number of districts. Source: Flora et al. (1983), Mackie and Rose (1991), Cook 
and Paxton (1998). 
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Voters per MP is the number of voters per MP elected to the main national parliament and is 
used as an alternative measure of the size of the electorate. Source: Flora et al. (1983), 
Mackie and Rose (1991), Cook and Paxton (1998). 
 
Effective parties is a dummy variable coded one in the year (and in subsequent years) in 
which political parties with a national organizational structure started to contest elections and 
zero before that. Source: Mackie and Rose (1991). 
 
POLITY IV index is an index of democratic institutions, ranging from -10 (extremely 
autocratic) to +10 (fully functional democracy). Source:  Marshall and Jaggers (2000). 
 
Left-wing parties is the share of seats held by left-wing parties in the main national 
parliament. Source: Mackie and Rose (1991). 
 
  
Sample: US states 
  
real income per worker is real state output (until 1920) or income (from 1929) per worker in 
2000 dollars. Source: Turner et al. (2007). 
 
average years of schooling is the average years of schooling of the workforce, estimated 
using the perpetual inventory method. Source: Turner et al. (2007). 
 
urbanization rate is the share of the population living in urban areas. Available for census 
years only. Interpolated linearly for the years in between. Source: Lee et al. (1957) and 
various US Census reports. 
  
women’s suffrage is a dummy taking the value one if women had the right to vote and zero 
otherwise. Source: Lott and Kenny (1999). 
 
poll tax is a dummy equal to zero in years without a poll tax requirement and equal to one 
otherwise. Source: Lott and Kenny (1999). 
 
literacy test is a dummy equal to zero in years without a literacy test requirement and equal to 
one otherwise. Source: Lott and Kenny (1999). 
 
land inequality is the share of land held by the 20 percent largest farms. Source: Galor et al. 
(2009). 
 
learning is defined as 
𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 =∑
𝐴𝑗(𝑡)
𝐷𝑖𝑗
,
𝑗
 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑗 is the distance (in miles) between the state capitals of state 𝑖 and 𝑗 and 𝐴𝑗(𝑡) is one 
if state 𝑗 has adopted the secret ballot at time 𝑡 and zero otherwise. Source: Own calculations. 
 
population is the number of inhabitants in the state in 1000s. Available for census years only. 
Interpolated linearly for the years in between. Source: Lee et al. (1957) and various US 
Census reports. 
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weighted income per worker is a weighted sum of log income in other states. The weights are 
the distance between state capitals (in miles). Source: Turner et al. (2007) and own 
calculations. 
 
regional dummies are coded according to the eight Bureau of Economic Analysis regions. 
Source: www.bea.gov. 
 
turnout rate is equal to the total number of votes cast in a gubernatorial election divided by 
the age and sex eligible population. Source: Burnham et al. (1971). 
 
Sample: Great Britain 
 
turnout is the total number of votes cast in each one-seat constituency in England, Wales, and 
Scotland in 1868 and 1874. Source: Craig (1977) and Berlinski and Dewan (2011). 
 
density is inhabitants per house in each constituency in 1861 and 1871. Source: 1861 and 
1871 Census of Great Britain. 
 
electorate is the number of registered voters in each constituency in 1868 and 1874. Source: 
Craig (1977) and Berlinski and Dewan (2011). 
 
Appendix S4: Empirical specification and robustness checks 
 
Duration dependency 
 
We capture duration dependence in the hazard rate through the function 𝐻(. ). The argument 
of the function is 𝑡 − 𝑡𝑖
𝑝 where 𝑡𝑖
𝑝
 represents either the year in which country 𝑖 enters the “ 
risk set” . To model duration dependence, we estimate 𝐻(. ) using natural cubic splines and 
use the estimated spline coefficients along with the number of years a country has been at “ 
risk”  of adopting (or since entry to the sample). We use a specification with two knots for the 
splines. 
In the Western Europe plus off-shoots, a formal test for duration dependency in the 
hazard rate cannot reject that the baseline hazard is constant over time. Our strong prior is 
that the hazard is increasing with time and we report specifications with duration dependence 
although it makes no difference to the results. 
 
Western Europe plus off-shoots 
 
First, as mentioned in the main text, we carry out instrumental variables estimations. We 
instrument for real GDP per capita and electorate/adult population. As in Acemoglu et al. 
(2008), we use a weighted index of real GDP in the other countries in the sample as an 
instrument for GDP per capita in a particular country. The logic is the international 
transmission of business cycle shocks. Specifically, Acemoglu et al. (2008) calculate their 
instrument as 
𝑌𝑖𝑡−1 = ∑ 𝜔𝑖𝑗𝑌𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡−1
𝑁
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖
 
where Y is (log) real GDP, N is the number of countries and 𝜔𝑖𝑗 is the weight given to real 
GDP in country j. We use a similar instrument, though the weights (the omegas) are not 
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defined by trade as in Acemoglu et al. (2008), but simply by the inverse of the distance 
between two countries as would be warranted by a gravity approach to international linkages. 
The validity of the instrument can, however, be challenged if social learning effects are 
strong. This is not the case in our data, but by controlling for the variable learning, we can 
rule out that movements in real GDP in other countries affect the probability of a secret ballot 
reform in a particular country, not through its effect on real GDP in that country, but through 
a social diffusion channel. While this instrument, in principle, is relevant for the entire 
sample, the second instrument only makes sense for the Western European countries. For this 
reason, the instrumental variable (IV) estimations are restricted to this sub-sample. Aidt and 
Jensen (2014) demonstrate that revolutionary events (as defined by Tilly (1993)) in other 
countries affect suffrage reforms in a particular country through a process of international 
diffusion of information. Revolutionary pressures are unlikely to be a direct cause of ballot 
reform, and so we use a measure of distance weighted revolutionary events, revolutionary 
threat, in other countries as an instrument for suffrage reform in a particular country. In 
addition to this, we exploit the high degree of path dependency in suffrage rules and make 
use of the one-year lag of electorate/adult population as an instrument. This allows us to test 
the validity of the extra instrument using an over-identification test. 
Table S4 reports the IV results. The IV estimates are based on a linear probability 
model, and for the smaller sample without the off-shoots. For comparison, we report the 
results from a logit and a linear probability model on this smaller sample in columns one and 
two. The IV estimates in column three confirm the modernization hypothesis and reject the 
franchise hypothesis. The first stage regressions are reported in the last two columns. The 
instruments are highly significant with large F-statistics for joint significance and pass the J-
test for over-identification. This suggests that the correlation between modernization and the 
timing of the secret ballot does, in fact, represent a causal mechanism. 
Second, we have, based on information from Flora et al. (1983), Mackie and Rose 
(1991), Cook and Paxton (1998), constructed an alternative measure of the size of the 
electorate, voters per MP, defined as the number of voters per seat of parliament. This 
measure is also insignificant. Importantly, the results for the modernization variables are 
unchanged. 
Third, we have estimated all models with a random effects logit estimator. The test of 
country specific random effects fails to reject the null of no country specific effects. 
Importantly, the modernization variables remain significant. 
Fourth, we measure landholding equality by the variable share of family owned farms 
(Vanhanen, 2003). This variable is only available from 1858. Accordingly, by including it in 
the model, we lose more than half the observations and three countries. The variable is not 
significant. The coefficient on real GDP per capita is significant and the two modernization 
variables remain jointly significant. The coefficient on electorate/adult population is negative 
but insignificant. 
Fifth, we have checked that the results are unaffected if we, instead, date the secret 
ballot in the USA to 1896 (rather than 1891) when ninety percent of the states were using the 
secret ballot (Mackie, 2000). We have also checked that the results are robust to excluding 
the USA or all the off-shoots from the estimations. 
Sixth, one can question whether population belongs to a model in which we are 
interested in estimating the effect of real GDP per capita and other variables measured 
relative to population size. The argument in favor is that scale effects could be important and 
by not including population directly, we could introduce omitted variables bias. The 
argument against is that by keeping the denominator of all the ratio variables constant, we 
estimate the various effects from variation in the nominator. On balance, we decided to report 
specifications with population size included. We have re-estimated all specifications without 
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population. It makes no difference to the results. 
Seventh, as noted in appendix S2, we have coded the adoption of the secret ballot in 
Germany to be 1913. We have checked that using the alternative coding (1903) makes no 
difference to the results. 
Eighth, in the main specification, we control for the extension of the suffrage but 
other institutional aspects could also be important. In Table S5, we investigate two suchs 
aspects. First, to control for the number of districts (and the fact that ballot reforms 
sometimes conincide with redistricting), we add the variable district (MPs) to the baseline. 
We see that the variable is negatively correlated with the adoption probability. Second, we 
add the POLITY IV index. This index is positively correlated with the adoption probability, 
but insignificant. In both cases, the evidence on the modernization effect remains strong.  
Ninth, we investigate the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between the real GDP 
per capita and the adoption probability. In Table S5, we show that there is some evidence of 
a U-shaped relationship for this sample but we cannot replicate this in the US state sample 
[not reported]. 
Finally, we observe that the first principal component is strongly and positively 
correlated with both modernization variables with a correlation coefficient of nearly 0.93. 
Thus, this variable captures modernization much better than the second principal component 
which is negatively correlated (correlation coefficient=-0.35) with urbanization rate and 
positively correlated with GDP per capita (correlation coefficient =0.35). 
 
The US states: the event history study. 
 
In Table S6, we present estimations in which we instrument for real income per worker, 
average years of schooling, and urbanization rate. We use a weighted index of real income in 
other states along with regional dummies for the eight economic areas of the USA as 
instruments. These capture that states that are located in the same region share similar 
geographical conditions, e.g., access to the sea, which are likely to affect economic 
development (GDP, urbanization, and human capital accumulation) but not, conditional on 
learning, the timing of the secret ballot. For comparison, we report the results from a logit 
and a linear probability model in columns one and two. The IV estimates in column three 
shows that the positive effect of average years of schooling is robust to instrumentation and 
that the three instrumented modernization variables are jointly significant. The first stage 
regressions are reported in the last three columns. The instruments are strong and pass the J-
test for over-identification. This points to a causal relationship running from modernization to 
secret ballot. 
Boix (2003, p. 122) notes that racial motives might have played a role in relation to 
the secret ballot. The share of blacks in the population is itself insignificant and it has no 
effect on our main results. We have re-estimated the model for the period after the civil war 
and the 15th amendment (1870 onwards) and without population size. Doing so, again, 
matters little for the results. Adding state specific random effects also has little effect on the 
results. The test of heterogeneous random effects across states fails to reject the null of no 
state specific effects. The three modernization variables correlate positively with the first 
component (correlation coefficients above 0.87). As seen in Table 2, column 5, the first 
component is highly significant with a positive sign. As in the case of Western Europe and 
off-springs, the other components do not measure modernization well. 
We have investigated the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between the real 
income per worker and the adopt probability and find that the relationship has overall 
significance, but the individual coefficients are imprecisely estimated. 
The factor loading are 0.9291 (for income), 0.9063 (for schooling) and 0.8703 (for 
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urbanization). 
  
The US states: the turnout model. 
 
The outcome variable (turnout rate) is a fractional variable bounded between zero and one. 
Papke and Wooldridge (1993) propose to use a logit link for fractional variables instead of 
the linear estimator. We find that using this method matters little for the results. We have 
added a linear trend to all the specifications. The trend is not significant and it makes no 
difference to the variables of interest. We include women’s suffrage in the regression model. 
This raises the question of time. Some states introduced women’s suffrage before the secret 
ballot (e.g., Wyoming, Utah, Georgia, Tennessee, North and South Carolina) while others did 
in 1920 when it became mandatory to do so and in many cases years after the secret ballot 
was introduced. We have re-estimated the panel model with women’s suffrage and the results 
regarding modernization are unaffected. Another issue is that while many states adopt the 
ballot between 1888 and 1896, there are a few which adopt much later (South Carolina in 
1950 and North Carolina in 1929). We have checked that these ‘temporal outliers’ do not 
influence the results by re-estimating the model without them. The results of interest are 
unaffected. 
 
 
 
Great Britain 
 
Our sample comprises 65 borough constituencies in England and Wales and 9 county 
constituencies in Wales and Scotland. This is not the entire universe of one-seat 
constituencies because data are sometimes missing and the 1868 or 1874 elections were 
sometimes uncontested. The results are robust to controlling for population growth (which in 
itself is not significant). 
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Table S1:  Institutional information for the Western Europe plus off-shoots sample. 
Country (year of 
entry to sample) 
Year of 
adoption of the 
secret ballot 
Year of 
franchise 
extensions 
(1820-1913) 
Electorate/adult 
population in 
year of first 
election or at 
independence 
(in year of 
adoption) 
Year of 
establishment 
of parties with 
nation-wide 
organizational 
structures  
Western Europe 
Netherlands 
(1830) 
1849 1848, 1887, 
1894 
4.6  
(4.6) 
1880 
 
Switzerland 
(1848) 
1872 1848 38.9 
(38.9) 
1890 
United Kingdom 
(1820) 
1872 1832, 1867, 
1884 
8.6 
(14.9) 
1880 
Belgium (1830) 1877 1831, 1848, 
1893  
1.9 
(3.7) 
1846 
Norway (1820) 1884 1814, 1884, 
1897 
11.4 
(11.4) 
1882 
Denmark (1820) 1901 1849 25.7 
(29.0) 
1870 
Finland (1820) 1906 1869, 1906 8.3 
(76.2) 
1890 
Austria (1867) 1907 1867, 1896, 
1907 
10.6 
(37.7) 
1889 
Sweden (1820) 1907 1866, 1907 9.8 
(14.0) 
1887 
France (1820) 1913 1824, 1830, 
1848 
0.5 
(43.4) 
1893 
Germany (1871) 1913 1871, 1919 33.0 
(38.7) 
1871 
Western off-shoots 
New Zealand 
(1856) 
1870 1860, 1867, 
1879 
29.1 
(33.8) 
1890 
Canada (1867) 1874 1898  22.0 
(23.1) 
1867 
USA (1820) 1891
a
 1870  n.a. 
(40.6) 
1828 
Notes: Italy is not included in the sample because it de facto adopted the secret vote in 1861 
at unification. Australia is not included in the sample because the secret ballot was introduced 
at the time of independence. a. This is the year when the majority of the US states has 
Australian ballot. 
Sources: See appendix S2. 
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Table S2: Institutional information for the US states sample. 
State Australian Ballot Women's suffrage Poll tax Literacy test 
Massachusetts 1888 1920 -1891 1857- 
Indiana 1889 1919   
Montana 1889 1914   
Rhode Island 1889 1917 -1888  
Mississippi 1890 1920 1889-1963 1890- 
Oklahoma 1890 1918  1912- 
Vermont 1890 1920   
Washington 1890 1910  1896- 
Wyoming 1890 1869  1889- 
Arizona 1891 1912  1912- 
Arkansas 1891 1917 1891-1963  
California 1891 1911  1894- 
Colorado 1891 1893   
Delaware 1891 1920 -1907 1897- 
Idaho 1891 1896   
Illinois 1891 1913   
Maine 1891 1919  1892 
Michigan 1891 1918   
Minnesota 1891 1919   
Missouri 1891 1919   
Nebraska 1891 1917   
Nevada 1891 1914 -1910  
New Hampshire  1891 1920  1902- 
North Dakota 1891 1917   
Ohio 1891 1919   
Oregon 1891 1912  1924- 
Pennsylvania 1891 1920 -1933  
South Dakota 1891 1918   
West Virginia 1891 1920   
Iowa 1892 1919   
Kentucky 1892 1920   
Maryland 1892 1920   
Alabama 1893 1920 1901-1963 1901- 
Kansas 1893 1912   
Wisconsin 1893 1919   
Virginia 1894 1920 1875-1882, 1902-1963 1902- 
Florida 1895 1920 1889-1927  
New York 1895 1917  1921- 
Louisiana 1896 1920 1898-1934 1898- 
Utah 1896 1870   
Texas 1905 1918 1902-1963  
Connecticut 1909 1920  1856- 
New Jersey 1911 1920   
New Mexico 1912 1920   
Tennessee 1921 1919 1870, 1890-1951  
Georgia 1922 1920 -1945 1908- 
North Carolina 1929 1920 1899-1920 1900- 
South Carolina 1950 1920 1895-1951 1895- 
Sources: Heckelman (1995), Lott and Kenny (1999, table 1), and Ludington (1911). 
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Table S3: Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimations. 
Variable Obs.     Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
   Western Europe plus off-shoots      
Real GDP per capita 2681 4753.56 4541.49 400 28129.23 
Urbanization rate 1488 197.45 135.91 0 631 
Electorate/adult population 1732 31.48 31.01 0 101.90 
Gini coefficient 1403 0.52 0.02 0.48 0.56 
Learning 1091 0.16 0.25 0 1.32 
Population (in 1000s) 2722 24571 38601 70 290343 
Revolutionary threat 1452 0.0003 0.001 0 0.015 
Distance weighted GDP 1872 0.35 0.10 0.12 0.56 
    US states      
Real income per worker 4778 12043.2 6336.738 1989.977 47727.45 
Average years of schooling 4798 4.92 2.55 0.20 11.11 
Urbanization rate 4828 32.29 21.84 0 92.62391 
Share of land held by the 20% 
largest farms 
1225 0.16 0.053 0.006 0.47 
Learning 2627 0.008 0.02 0 0.10 
Population 4858 1,682,579 1,942,818 6,077 14,900,000 
Distance weighted income 5220 1.64 0.58 0.28 2.89 
Turnout rate 1426 52.30 19.30 2.13 99.99 
      Great Britain       
Turnout 74 2260 1812 572 8496 
Density 74 5.6 1.8 4 13.5 
Electorate 74 2813 2391 706 10352 
Note: We do not report statistics for dummy variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 55 of 58
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/comppolstud
Comparative Political Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
56 
 
Table S4: The effect of modernization on the probability of secret ballot in the Western 
Europe sample. Instrumental variables estimations. 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Reform Reform Reform Log(GDP 
per capita) 
Electorate/ 
adult 
population 
log(real GDP per capita) 8.41* 0.064** 0.065**   
 [1.84] [3.08] [2.33]   
Electorate/adult population 0.047 0.00065 -0.00015   
 [1.27] [0.81] [-0.47]   
Instrumental variables      
Distance weighted GDP    2.09*** 1.28 
    [26.49] [0.66] 
Lagged electorate/adult 
population 
   -0.003*** 0.98*** 
    [-6.70] [77.60] 
Revolutionary threat    0.0067* 0.35*** 
    [1.66] [3.55] 
Control variables      
Gini coefficient 9.76 0.086 0.15 4.10*** 3.86 
 [0.29] [0.33] [0.51] [10.37] [0.40] 
log(population) -0.90** -0.011** -0.0083** 0.099*** 0.12 
 [-2.46] [-2.45] [-1.99] [18.21] [0.91] 
Learning -2.08 -0.022 -0.0043 0.18*** -0.39 
 [-1.32] [-0.81] [-0.14] [6.22] [-0.538] 
Control for duration  
dependence and constant 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Observations 692 692 688 688 688 
First stage F-test    236.36*** 2227.99*** 
J-test (over-ID test)   0.686   
Number of countries 11 11 11 11 11 
Estimation method Logit OLS 2SLS First stage First Stage 
Notes: See Table 1. The off-shoots are not included in the sample. 
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Table S5: Selected additional robustness checks for Western Europe plus off-shoots sample. Dependent variable: reform 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
log(real GDP per capita) 6.36** 6.36** 7.054* 6.47** 10.15*** 7.18** -105.3** 
 [2.44] [2.41] [1.73] [2.50] [3.14] [2.45] [2.00] 
log(real GDP per capita), squared       7.39** 
       [2.05] 
Electorate/adult population 0.037 0.037 -0.0135 0.037 0.04 0.04 -0.11* 
 [1.26] [1.25] [-0.47] [1.32] [1.55] [1.44] [1.83] 
Electorate/adult population, squared       0.003** 
       [2.60] 
Gini coefficient 28.49 28.59 21.72 30.31 37.9 25.79 44.92 
 [1.44] [1.39] [0.80] [1.40] [1.28] [1.45] [1.63] 
log(population) -0.50** -0.50* -0.40 -0.50** -0.42 -0.104 -0.72*** 
 [-2.04] [1.67] [1.60] [2.18] [1.86] [0.36] [2.89] 
Learning -1.18 -1.18 0.456 -1.54 -0.78 -1.72 -0.23 
 [-0.94] [-0.92] [0.293] [1.20] [0.52] [1.17] [0.27] 
Left-wing parties  0.0003      
  [0.007]      
Polity IV   0.05     
   [0.62]     
Effective parties    0.55 49.8   
    [0.49] [1.50]   
Effective parties*log (real GDP per capita)     -6.33   
     [1.50]   
Districts (MPs)      -0.004*  
      [1.65]  
Control for duration dependence  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 779  779 691 779 779 779 779 
Estimation method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit 
Notes:  Robust z-statistics correcting for clustering by country in brackets (i.e., we allow the errors to be correlated over time within countries, but not between countries). 
Constants not reported. All estimations based on sample of 14 countries. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table S6: The effect of modernization of the probability of secret ballot in US states, 1840-
1950. Instrumental variables estimation. 
 Austra-
lian 
ballot 
Austra-
lian  
ballot 
Austra-
lian 
ballot 
Log(real  
income 
per 
worker)     
average 
years of 
schooling 
Urbanize- 
tion 
rate 
The modernization hypothesis       
log(real income per worker) 1.239** 0.010** 0.0165    
 [2.374] [2.12] [1.459]    
average years of schooling 0.324* 0.0027 0.0101*    
 [1.910] [1.11] [1.957]    
urbanization rate -0.00661 0.000465 -0.00059    
 [-0.384] [1.30] [-1.127]    
Joint significance of 
modernization variables 
20.74*** 7.68*** 37.14***    
The franchise hypothesis       
women's suffrage 0.156 0.00841 0.015 -0.264* -0.088 0.569 
 [0.331] [0.394] [0.706] [-1.935] [-0.514] [0.261] 
literacy test -0.775 -0.0402* -0.00325 0.123 -0.331** 4.536 
 [-1.086] [-1.86] [-1.306] [1.153] [-2.047] [0.934] 
poll taxes -0.254 -0.014* -0.001 -0.021 -0.586** 3.691 
 [-0.614] [-1.246] [-0.0772] [0.261] [-2.034] [0.47] 
Joint significance of  
franchise variables 
1.72 1.73 4.16    
Control variables       
log(population) -0.0877 -0.00084 0.00195 -0.0022 0.19*** 3.21* 
 [-1.027] [-0.45] [0.676] [-0.082] [2.72] [1.91] 
Learning -5.353 0.64 0.75 -0.0209 3.08 69.35 
 [-0.385] [1.27] [1.61] [-0.0307] [0.80] [0.94] 
Instrumental variables       
Weighted income per worker    0.0215 0.00096 10.48 
    [0.136] [0.0414] [1.51] 
New England    -0.423 0.828** -7.489 
    [-1.508] [2.21] [0.719] 
Mid East    -0.343 -0.636 -7.602 
    [-1.209] [-1.512] [-0.826] 
Great Lakes    -0.436* -0.394 -20.02*** 
    [-1.876] [-0.97] [3.535] 
Plains    -0.524** -0.77*** -18.51*** 
    [-2.412] [-2.135] [-4.442] 
South East    -1.065*** -2.265*** -28.65*** 
    [-4.975] [-7.146] [-4.939] 
South West    -0.063*** -2.329 -19.53*** 
    [-3.375] [-4.051] [-4.664] 
Far West    0.216 -0.179 -2.583* 
    [1.030] [0.638] [0.506] 
First stage F-test    10.34** 44.00** 10.46** 
J-test (over-ID test)   3.94    
Estimation method Logit OLS 2SLS First stage First stage First stage 
Control for duration  
dependence and constant 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,186 2,186 2,186 2,186 2,186 2,186 
Notes: See Table 2. Excluded region is Rocky Mountains. The number of states is 44. 
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